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Abstract
Traditional theories of electoral reform have focused on the outcomes of reform as a way of explaining the
rational-strategic actions of political elites. Recently, the literature has moved from an ex post to an ex ante
approach, analyzing the context and process of reform independent of its expected outcomes. This new
conceptualization of electoral reform has produced new analytic frameworks, from which I propose to explore
the development of an explanatory theory of electoral reform.
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Introduction
In 1994, New Zealand adopted a wholesale change in their electoral formula, moving from First Past
the Post to a more proportional Mixed Member Proportional system. This change occurred despite the fact that
the consequences of reform would benefit smaller parties at the expense of the traditionally dominant players in
New Zealand politics. In 1997, the UK Labour party was swept into power in Westminster after thirty years of
conservative rule. Labour campaigned in part on electoral reform for national elections; when they finally
gained power, they lost their appetite for reform. Changes were implemented at the subnational and European
parliament level, but the national-level electoral system wouldn’t get an up-or-down vote for reform for another
14 years. In 2004, a referendum on electoral reform in British Columbia, Canada failed to pass by just 3%. A
second vote was held five years later, and the referendum failed to pass by 21%.
Why do some seemingly viable electoral reform efforts fail, while others succeed? Traditional theories
of electoral reform have focused on the outcomes of reform as a way of explaining the rational-strategic actions
of political elites. Such an approach would explain why elites would support reform, but not why a reform
would succeed or fail. Recently, the literature has moved from an ex post to an ex ante approach, analyzing the
context and process of reform independent of its expected outcomes. This new conceptualization of electoral
reform has produced new analytic frameworks, from which I propose to explore the development of an
explanatory theory of the success or failure of viable reform efforts.
In order to undertake this exploratory exercise, I will begin with a framework developed by Matthew
Flinders (2010) to provide a context/process-based analysis of what he dubs “majoritarian modification” (the
attempt to replace a plurality electoral system in a traditionally majoritarian democracy with an electoral system
that is either more proportional in its outcomes, or gives voters more choice in the form of preferential ballot
structures). The outcome of such a reform would often not be in the rational-strategic interest of the governing
parties, and would possibly run counter to the embedded values of the majoritarian political culture. Under
those conditions, any such attempt that reaches a certain level of viability is worth study (and successful reforms
of this type even more so). I will incorporate recent theoretical work by Pippa Norris (2011), Alan Renwick
(2011), Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y Hazan (2011), and Kristof Jacobs and Monique Leyenaar (2011), to
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expand Flinders’ analysis from two explanatory variables to four, and I will broaden Flinders’ case selection
from the two in-depth (and one cursory) analyses he provides to 13 in-depth case studies that encompass all
viable attempts at majoritarian modification in the countries he studies, from 1991 to present (with 1991 being
selected as a cut-off to control for the possible demonstration effect of the fall of the Soviet Union).
Having illuminated the 13 cases in depth to measure the for the presence or absence of the proposed
explanatory variables, I will use Proportional Reduction of Error (Frankfort-Nachimas and Leon-Guerrero,
2009) to test the independent explanatory power of each proposed causal variable, and then use crisp-set
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin n.d.; Bernard 2006; Hopkin 2010) to try to understand how the
relationship between the rational-strategic, institutional, and political-cultural factors captured in those
explanatory variables contribute to a context and process for electoral reform that increases the likelihood of
success. The analysis will either confirm a causal relationship between the theorized explanatory variables
(alone or in combination) and the outcome of a viable majoritarian modification effort, or (in the absence of
confirmation) suggest alternative causal relationships that could be pursued in future research.
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Literature Review: Three Waves of Analysis
The last 30 years have seen the field of electoral systems and electoral reform blossom from what
Lijphart called “the most underdeveloped subject in political science” (Lijphart 1985, 3) to a rich and vibrant
area of study. Leyenaar and Hazan (2011, 438) have identified three waves of electoral reform analysis. The
first wave, which occurred prior to 1980, concerned the categorization of electoral systems and their
consequences. This period gave us the famous “Duverger’s Law” (Duverger 1954) and the exhaustive
categorizations of Douglas Rae (1967). The second wave coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and the
subsequent explosion of major electoral system reforms, both in new and established democracies. The study of
reform focused mostly on the strategic actions of political elites as they related to the expected consequences of
reform. But the study of the consequences of electoral systems and electoral reform were broadened beyond
their effect on the party system. Studies also looked at the relationship between electoral systems and
governability, participation, accountability, and other measures of the health and quality of democracy
(Leyenaar and Hazan 2011, 439)
Since the mid-2000s, electoral system and reform analysis has been in the midst of a third wave of
development. This period is characterized by an expansion and clarification of the concept of electoral reform,
beyond the traditional notion of system change (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). Leyenaar and Hazan (2011, 438)
describe the third wave as a shift from consequences to concepts, where the focus is on a comprehensive
conceptualization of electoral reform. Such a conceptualization seeks to move away from the rational choice
paradigm, toward an understanding of reform that takes into account the effects of political culture, institutions,
and context. A summary of Leyenaar and Hazan’s survey of third wave literature is presented in Table 1.
The following sections will discuss electoral systems, their consequences, and the sources of reform, in
a pattern resembling the three waves of literature in the field. First, I will provide a brief categorization of
electoral systems and their consequences. Then, I will discuss the transitional literature from the second to the
third wave. Finally, I will discuss third wave analysis of electoral reform, and suggest an area for future
research that this thesis will attempt to unpack.
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Table 1: Status and Need in Third Wave Electoral Reform Literature
Source: Leyenaar and Hazan 2011, 440
Focus

Status

Need

WHAT

Bias toward major reform, system

More expansive definition of

change

reform

Theories of self-interest and seat-

More comprehensive explanations

WHY

maximization dominate
WHO

Parties and elites

Mass mobilization, the courts

HOW

Case studies

Combine qualitative and
quantitative methods, crossnational studies

WHERE

Established democracies

New and transitional democracies

The First Wave: Electoral Systems, Reform, and Political Culture
An effective categorization of electoral systems and their consequences requires an understanding of
the concepts of majoritarian and consensus political cultures, as well as an appreciation for how different
electoral systems operate within the values of those cultures. The distinction between majoritarian and
consensus democracy was developed by Arend Lijphart in his seminal book Patterns of Democracy (1999).
Lijphart defines democracy as a government “by and for the people”, but observes that such a definition begs
two questions: who will do the governing, and whose interests should be furthered when the people being
governed disagree (Lijphart 1999, 1-8)? According to Lijphart, the political culture of a country can be
categorized based how that country answers those two questions. One way to answer the questions is to say
“the majority of the people.” The majority of the people should decide who governs, and when the wishes of
the people come into conflict, the majority opinion should rule. Another possible answer is to say “the most
people possible.” Governments should be formed from a broad coalition of diverse interests, with as many
people having a say as possible. And when conflicts arise, governments should institute solutions that represent
a compromise with which all parties can live. These two answers represent two distinct political cultures: the
majoritarian democracy, and the consensus democracy.
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Lijphart complicates the simplicity of this analysis by suggesting that the two questions (who governs,
and whose interests are represented) need not necessarily share a common answer. Countries must be evaluated
along two dimensions: the executives-parties dimension, and the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart 1999, 3).
The executive-parties dimension measures how majoritarian or consensus a country is in answer to the “who
governs” question. Five variables measure the level of majoritarianism or consensualism along the executiveparties dimension:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Concentration of power: is power concentrated in the executive (or a single-party cabinet), or is it
shared between the executive a multi-party coalition?
Executive-legislative relations: is the executive dominant, or are the executive and legislature
equal?
Party system: are there two competitive parties, or more than two?
Electoral system: is the electoral system majoritarian (or pluralist) and disproportional in nature, or
is it proportional in its votes-to-seats ratio?
Interest group competition: is the interest group system pluralist and competitive, or is it
corporatist and cooperative?

The second dimension of analysis is the federal-unitary dimension, which offers five criteria measuring how
centralized or federal a political system is, with the implication that unitary states are more majoritarian while
federal states are more cooperative. The two dimensions aren’t always related; for example, the United States is
highly majoritarian on the executive-parties dimension, but highly consensual along the federal-unitary
dimension. It is the first dimension that is relevant to the analysis of Third-Wave electoral systems studies (i.e.
Flinders 2010; Shugart 2008), because it is in the first dimension that we see the relationship between electoral
systems and political culture.
Lijphart reiterates the strong connection between electoral system and political culture by observing
that while electoral reform is common within majoritarian and proportional systems, very few countries ever
change from proportional representation (PR) to a majority/plurality system, or vice versa (1999, 143). He even
notes that when asked about PR in 1993, US President Bill Clinton remarked that it was “undemocratic” and he
couldn’t support it (1999, 143-4). Majoritarian and plurality electoral systems sit comfortably in majoritarian
political cultures both because of the democratic values inherent in their design, and because of the nature of
their effects on party systems and vote-to-seat ratios. Proportional electoral systems (and mixed systems, to a
lesser extent) fit well in consensus democracies for the same reasons.
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The most common plurality electoral system is Single Member District Plurality (SMP), sometimes
referred to as First Past the Post (FPTP) or Winner Take All. SMP is used in the US, Canada, the UK (for
elections to the House of Commons), India, and 43 other countries (Reynolds et al. 2005, 31). As the name
implies, SMP elects one representative from each electoral district (or, put another way, the District Magnitude
(DM) = 1), and the single candidate who receives the most votes (a plurality, but not necessarily a majority)
wins. SMP is praised for its simplicity, its stability, and its constituency representation (Farrell 2011, 14). It is
simple for voters to understand and for election workers to count; it doesn’t require complex ballot structures or
complicated formulas to determine the winner. It’s stable in the sense that it produces clear winners, creates
incentives for two-party competition, and manufactures artificially large majorities (more on this later). It’s the
best system for constituency representation in the sense that, unlike proportional systems or systems with multimember districts (DM>1), there is exactly one representative for each district to hold accountable.
The United States political system is the ideal-type case for the effects of SMP. In the 2004 election,
the two major political parties received 97.7% of the votes cast and obtained 98.8% of the seats in the House of
Representatives (Bowler et al. 2005, 193). This is due to the incentives for party competition and voting
behavior systemic in SMP, known as “Duverger’s Law” (Lijphart 1999, 165). Maurice Duverger proposed in
1965 that plurality systems would lead to two-party systems and proportional representation would lead to
multi-party systems for a combination of mechanical and psychological reasons. Mechanically, only one party
can win in each district, which creates an incentive for supporters of the party that comes in third, fourth, etc. to
cast their votes for whichever of the top two parties are closest to them ideologically. Third party support
gradually winnows away until only two parties (with broad ideological coalitions of supporters) are competitive
in each district. The psychological factor reinforces the mechanical one; votes for third parties come to be seen
as “wasted votes” (sometimes called the spoiler effect, or more recently, the Nader effect), and therefore voters
continue to support the two major parties even when they’re dissatisfied with those parties. Duverger’s Law has
recently come under scrutiny, as healthy multi-party competition has arisen in both Canada (Massicotte 2005,
100) and India (Heath et al. 2005, 137). One explanation for this is the effect of regionalism; parties with
regional appeal, like the Bloc Quebecois in Canada and several ethnic parties in India, are more popular in their
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home constituencies than the two major parties1. The principles of Duverger’s Law still hold true in each
individual constituency, but because the same two parties aren’t competitive in each constituency, the aggregate
effect is a multi-member party system.
The manufactured nature of two-party competition is one complaint against SMP; the other is its
propensity to manufacture the size of a winning party’s majority (Farrell 2011, 22). The distorting effect of
SMP can be seen in US elections. In 1998, the Republican Party received 48.5% of the vote for the House of
Representatives, but 51.3% of the seats. In the Senate, they received 49.8% of the vote and 52.9% of the seats.
In the Governor’s races, they received 51.0% of the vote and 63.9% of the seats (Bowler et al. 2005, 193). The
distortion is a result of the nature of plurality victories: in a two party race, 50% +1 of the vote can win 100% of
the seats. As little as 33% +1 of the vote can win 100% of the seats, if a third party enters the fray. If a party
wins half of its constituencies by a narrow margin, and loses the other half by a blowout, it can still obtain a
majority of the seats in the legislature despite receiving fewer votes nationally than the other party. In other
words, the margin of victory in a plurality election is irrelevant; every vote cast for a party beyond the minimum
needed for victory is a wasted vote, as is every vote cast for the losing party.
If a disproportionate vote-to-seat translation and a two-party political system are the outcomes of SMP,
then it is the perfect system for a political culture that values majority rule over consensus and compromise. For
those countries with a more consensual political culture, proportional representation (PR) is a better fit. The
most common form of PR is List PR, which is used in 70 countries worldwide, including more than half of the
countries in Western Europe (Reynolds et al. 2005, 31). List PR uses multi-member districts (DM>1) instead of
the single-member districts used in SMP. There is considerable variation in the arrangement of list systems; in
the Netherlands and Israel, the entire country is one electoral district, while South Africa is divided into nine
electoral districts with the number of representatives in each district ranging from four to forty-six, and an
additional 200 representatives allocated based on the aggregate national vote (Andeweg 2005, 491; Gouws and
Mitchell 2005, 360; Rahat and Hazan 2005, 333). In List PR, voters cast their votes not for an individual
candidate, but for a party list. The percentage of votes each party receives determines the percentage of

1

This explanation may well apply in some cases, but healthy multi-party competition under SMP has recently
been observed in many Canadian ridings, casting doubt on the inviolability of Duverger’s Law. While outside
the scope of this project, it is an area worthy of further study.
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representatives they send to the legislature from that district, and the seats are allocated in the order of the party
list. For example, if a district has ten representatives, and Party A receives 50% of the vote, the first five names
on the Party A list are elected. If Party B receives 10% of the vote, only the first name on their list is elected.
List PR systems vary in their ballot structure, allocation formula, and district magnitude/tier structure
(Farrell 2011, 64-88). List PR ballots can be structured as open, preferential, or closed. In a closed list system,
voters simply vote for a party; the names on the party list and the order in which they appear are determined by
the party. This is the system used for the PR portion of Germany’s Mixed Member system (more on that later).
Belgium uses a preferential ballot; voters must select a party list, but then have the option of re-ranking the
candidates on that list in whatever order they prefer. When the vote is counted, the seats are allocated based on
who got the most first place votes, second place votes, etc. This option allows for more voter input in terms of
who represents them, but the voters are still restricted to the names that appear on the party list. The third type
of ballot structure, known as Open-List PR, is used in Finland and other places. Voters are allowed to rank
order the names on the party list, but they can also add names from other party lists to create their own
customized, multi-party list. This makes vote counting and seat distribution incredibly complicated, but gives
the voters the most input into who represents them.
District magnitudes vary from system to system, as discussed earlier. A country can use a single
electoral district with a high DM, multiple regional districts with varying DMs, or implement a “tiered” system
that combines a national district with regional constituencies. A higher DM will result in a more proportional
outcome, because it eliminates the distortion caused by rounding errors (Farrell 2011, 74). Another way to
increase proportionality is through the formula for seat allocation. The two most common formulas are the
d’Hondt method (or Highest Average) and the Hare Quota (or Least Remainder). D’Hondt uses division to
convert votes into seats; Hare uses subtraction. The details of the counting process are not important here; what
matters is that while D’Hondt results in slightly more disproportional results than Hare, PR systems in general
produce much more proportional results than SMP (Farrrell 2011, 157).
Duverger’s Law predicts that PR systems lead to multi-party governments, and the facts bear out that
prediction (Farrell 2011, 161). Multi-party parliamentary governments require coalitions to form majorities,
which in turn requires bargaining, compromise, and cooperation. It is because of this outcome that PR electoral
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systems fit so well in Lijphart’s model of consensus democracy. The policy that results from coalition
bargaining will require the overlapping consensus of a minimum winning coalition of diverse ideologies; such
policy is bound to be equally pleasing (or displeasing) to everyone involved. Detractors of PR point to the
ineffectual nature of such policy, as well as the lack of accountability and constituency service endemic to
multi-member districts. Voters are not tied to an individual representative, so they have no one to directly
address their local, specific concerns. Furthermore, they have no one to punish if they don’t like the policies of
government; voters can only hold entire parties accountable, not specific representatives. The third major
concern with PR and multi-party systems is that because coalition formation and bargaining only occurs after
the parties are elected to parliament, voters have no way of knowing which policies their favored party will
pursue when in office, and which policies will be dropped in the course of negotiations. The nature of the
government is out of the voters’ hands. While these critiques are addressed in SMP and other plurality/majority
electoral systems, those systems have their own problems. As discussed above, SMP squeezes out third parties,
limiting the ideologies represented at the legislative level (which in turns limits the scope of debate of policy).
SMP produces artificial majorities and distorted outcomes, potentially leading to an “upside-down” election in
which the party with most votes nationally fails to win the most seats. The apparent trade-off between the
stability and accountability of SMP and the proportionality and diversity of PR has given rise to a third family
of electoral systems, the Mixed Member systems.
There are two basic forms of mixed systems: the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system, also
called the Parallel system, and the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system (Reynolds et al. 2005, 29). In
Parallel systems, a portion of the seats in the legislature are elected from single-member constituencies using
SMP, while the rest of the seats are selected separately using a PR formula. Voters cast two votes at the polls:
one for a constituency representative, and one for a party. This system was adopted by several post-communist
countries in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, including Russia (White 200,: 318). MMP also divides the legislature
between PR seats and SMP seats, with voters casting two votes. But instead of the two sections being elected
separate from one another, MMP uses the PR seats to adjust for the disproportional outcome of the SMP
election. After the SMP seats are allocated, the PR seats are portioned out such that the proportion of seats in
the entire legislature (including the SMP seats) reflects the proportion of the PR vote each party received.
Therefore, those parties who won a number of SMP seats disproportionately larger than their share of the party
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vote will receive fewer PR seats, while those parties whose SMP seats under-represent their share of the vote
will receive a “top-up” of PR seats to even up their representation in the legislature. This system has been in
place in Germany since after World War II, and was recently adopted in New Zealand and Lesotho, and six
other countries (Reynolds et al. 2005, 31).
Mixed systems represent a compromise in the trade-off between the costs and benefits of SMP and PR
(Farrell 2011, 93). Voters still have a district representative who can provide constituency services, and who
can be held personally accountable for policy failures. But the distorting effects of SMP on party competition
are compensated for by the PR element (MMP is a more proportional system than MMM, but both are more
proportional in their vote-to-seat ratio than SMP). Because mixed systems are more proportional than
plurality/majority systems, the move from plurality/majority to Mixed or PR represents a trade-off of stability
and constituency service for proportionality and diversity of representation. The motivations for engaging in a
reform effort, and therefore recalculating the costs and benefits of that trade off, are the subject of second and
third wave literature.
The Politics of Electoral Reform: Second Wave and Transitional Literature
Electoral reform has historically been a rare process. The rarity of change resulted in a kind of
conservatism in political science regarding electoral reform. But starting in the early 1990s, a wave of electoral
reforms swept established democracies and newly democratized countries alike, resulting in a call for new
analysis and new understanding of the nature of electoral reform.
The conservatism of the existing literature on electoral systems was noted by Patrick Dunleavy and
Helen Margetts (1995). In their appraisal, the norm is for voting systems not to change. Electoral systems can
endure even when the majority of the public supports change because of the capacity of elites to shape agendas.
However, recent cross pressures of party fragmentation and demands for accountability in established
democracies led to a propensity for reforms from existing systems to new Mixed Member electoral systems in
the model of Germany. Three countries transitioned to MM systems in 1993; Italy, Japan, and New Zealand.
In all three cases, diverse influences eroded the historically rooted distinctiveness of each country’s system,
making an MM system an appealing alternative.
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Electoral systems reflect the deeply-rooted aspects of “national character and political life” across
democracies (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995). As a by-product of a historically developed political culture,
electoral systems represent the salient political debates at the time of their formation. According to Dunleavy
and Margetts, they change only when they no longer have the capacity to address contemporary debates.
Reforms in Italy, Japan, and New Zealand each represent the culmination of dissatisfaction with the evolution
of the political system. Citizens were especially dissatisfied with their inability to control the behavior of
politicians and parties. Japan and New Zealand changed systems after experiencing “high levels of public
dissatisfaction with politicians and doubt about the accountability, efficacy and legitimacy of the political
systems” (Sakamoto 1999, 421). Italy was in a more perilous state, having undergone a major corruption
scandal. However, the changes in the Italian system were designed to target specific misbehaving parties, not to
overthrow the whole system in a revolution.
All three countries, plus the newly democratized Russia, transitioned to a system that mixed plurality
and proportional representation. These developments undermine traditional expectations for electoral reform,
which are rooted in political science “conservatism” and mistake what “is” for what “is natural.” Instead,
according to Dunleavy and Margetts, electoral reform should be construed as preference-shaping behavior by
parties and elites. Electoral systems can be defined in terms of their limits in approaching an ideal-type, and
therefore the system will be under permanent contestation.
The “ideal” electoral system, according to Dunleavy and Margetts, satisfies two sets of criteria that are
seemingly at odds: democratic principles, and the good management of the state apparatus. The criteria that
satisfy democratic principles are political equality, representation of viewpoints, accountability, and the impact
on public policy. Good management of the state apparatus is measured in terms of governability, party-system
stability, and the handling of social conflicts. Whereas the literature has traditionally oversimplified electoral
systems (plurality is good for state management, PR is good for democratic criteria), a more nuanced evaluation
reveals that each system has strengths and weaknesses in both areas. In order to understand the origins and
processes of electoral reform (the dynamics), we have to understand how the demands for different democratic
needs and state management needs pull the parties and political elites in different directions.
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Many countries adopted mixed systems in the 1990s. Dunleavy and Margetts suggest that the move
toward mixed systems represents a compromise at the elite level to address the dual criteria of democratic needs
and state management. But in the 2000s, several mixed system countries shifted to PR, seemingly at odds with
Dunleavy and Margetts’ explanation. T.C. Lundberg (2009) tries to explain why post-communist states largely
abandoned mixed systems in the 2000s for PR. According to Lundberg, in some cases PR was adopted under
democratically competitive conditions (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Ukraine), while countries that
are semi-authoritarian (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) have used PR to reduce competition and undermine
multiparty democracy.
Mixed systems were adopted in post-communist countries when they democratized as a way for new
parties to hedge their bets, giving the parties a sense of how well they would operate in both a plurality and PR
environment. Systems are adopted according to the rational calculations of political actors; parties calculate
how many seats they will gain or lose under various systems, and then advocate for one accordingly. Lundberg
contests that electoral reform is often related to party system changes that arise when new issue dimensions are
introduced into political competition. When new social issues arise, establishment parties advocate shifts to PR
in order to mitigate their electoral losses to new parties. The overall trend in democracies in the 20th century
was toward proportionality. Mixed systems historically have been implemented by dominant parties in an
electoral environment where the dominant party is in decline, and new parties are rising to national prominence.
Therefore, the countries that abandon mixed systems are countries where dominant-party systems have
transformed into competitive systems.
Lundberg argues that semi-authoritarian countries have abandoned mixed systems in order to choke off
multiparty competition. In a mixed system, a party that cannot win a proportional seat due to a high minimum
threshold for qualification can try to access the legislature by focusing on winning plurality seats in small
constituencies. Authoritarian governments can make the national threshold artificially high to keep out fringe
or opposition parties, but in order to keep these parties out of the legislature, they have to eliminate the plurality
seats altogether. Lundberg argues that this is the reason Russia abandoned its mixed system under Putin.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also moved from a mixed system to PR to reduce the influence of
opposition parties. Kyrgyzstan uses a double-threshold (5% regional, 5% national) in order to choke out small
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parties and parties with only regional appeal. The main opposition party was kept out of the legislature because
it failed to clear the threshold in one region, despite clearing the national threshold easily. Kazakhstan instituted
an unusually high 7% threshold, as well as barring independent candidates and banning representatives from
being able to leave their parties.
While these are examples of electoral reform being used to limit democracy, other countries made the
transition to increase democracy. In Bulgaria, the government used a mixed system as a transitional system out
of communism. The first democratically elected government shifted to PR because it wanted to establish
democratic credibility, and PR had historically been used in Bulgaria during times of peaceful democracy
(mixed systems had been used during periods of corruption and fraud in Bulgaria’s past). The transition was
more than “rational,” because the government in power had done well using the mixed rules. The transition was
historical and cultural in nature; establishing the credibility of the government in a newly democratized state
was the government’s highest priority.
Croatia changed its system from a mixed system to PR so that the dominant party could mitigate its
losses in the wake of its leader’s death. List PR continues to be used despite the polarized nature of the
electorate, which is divided on ethnic lines. Ukraine transitioned from MM to PR to strengthen the existing
parties. Like in Russia, small parties were winning seats in the plurality constituencies, fragmenting the party
system. Fragmentation in the legislature shifted the balance of power toward the president; PR was adopted
with a lower threshold in order to remove the fragmentation caused by the plurality seats while simultaneously
making the PR seats more competitive. These reforms accompanied constitutional reforms that weakened the
president and strengthened the legislature.
Not all reforms reflect the rational calculations of political actors or the historical and cultural
precedents of the political system. External pressures can also lead to reform, as they did in Macedonia. The
anti-Communist party was poised to win control of government, and to change from MM to a plurality system
in the hopes of inflating their majority in future elections. But before they could institute a change, armed
conflict broke out with the ethnic Albanian minority. Part of the peace agreement between the Macedonian
state and the Albanian minority included adopting a full PR system that would make the Albanians more
competitive in elections (no threshold). These recommendations were pushed by the Organization for Security
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and Cooperation in Europe. Macedonia accepted the move to PR and a decentralization of their government in
the hopes of one day joining the EU and NATO.
Albania also moved from MM to PR under external pressure. NATO offered Albania a conditional
invitation to join; the adoption of PR was one of the recommended reforms to gain admittance. Albania’s
existing MM system failed to establish true proportionality, because large parties encouraged voters to cast
plurality votes for the main party and PR votes for “allied” parties. This ticket-splitting phenomenon tweaked
the “top-up” formula of MMP in such a way as to advantage large parties and their coalition partners, and
disadvantage small opposition parties.
Lundberg’s examples are cases of partisan self-interest, dominated by elite-level considerations of the
consequences of reform. Renwick et al. (2009) continue the argument for partisan self-interest in their
evaluation of Italy’s second electoral reform, in 2005. The trend away from MM systems continued in Italy,
which switched back to its pre-1993 system of modified PR. Renwick et al. argue that this case of electoral
reform conforms to the expectations of a rational choice model. The reform was instigated by the ruling party,
in order to bolster that party’s power interests. But their power-based motivations were more complex than a
simple goal like seat-maximization. In order to understand the motivations and the processes of electoral
reform in Italy, the authors propose a new framework for analyzing the various power-oriented considerations
of the dominant party, and how they operate in electoral reform.
The 2005 reform makes for an interesting case, because it was entirely driven by politicians (the 1993
reforms were in response to public outcry against corruption and fraud). While politicians are operating in their
own power-maximizing self-interest, it is necessary to operationalize power-maximization beyond the simple
scope of seat-maximization in the legislature. An analysis of coalition dynamics must also come into play. In a
single-party dominant environment, seat-maximization is equivalent to power-maximization. But in a
multiparty system like Italy that relies on coalition governments, power-maximization is better defined as the
maximization of your own party’s seats, but not at the expense of your coalition partner’s seats.
Renwick et al. develop a typology of power-seeking consideration in electoral reform, which looks at
both the desired outcomes and necessary actions of reform-minded politicians in order to achieve four different
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dimensions of power-maximization. Those four dimensions are: a share of voters’ underlying partisan
preferences, a share of seats in the legislature (given a share of voters’ preferences), influence over government
and achievement of policy goals (given a maximized seat share), and intra-party power. The importance of
Renwick et al’s work on Italy is that it demonstrates the complexity of interests at play in the reform process,
and the necessity for multiple factors to be in play in order for reform to occur.
Whereas Italy saw two electoral reforms in the span of a decade, reform in the UK has been a slow
process. Butler (2004) attempts to understand why the translation from votes to seats in the UK was never a
salient political topic, and why electoral reforms suddenly became fashionable in the late 1990s. According to
Butler, almost every official government inquiry into the UK electoral system has recommended changing the
formula to improve the votes-to-seats ratio. The Blake Commission (1976) recommended MMP (the British
refer to it as Additional Member System, or AMS). The Ullswater Committee (1930) and the Plant Committee
(1992) recommended AV. The Jenkins Commission (1998) recommended a mixed system that combined AV
with PR.
The plurality system in UK elections used to produce a ratio referred to as the Cube Law. If the ratio
of votes for the two major parties were A: B, the ratio of seats would be A3:B3. But after 1971, the ratio
dwindled to A2:B2, and by the 1990s there was a clear bias toward Labour. If Labour and the Conservatives
split the vote 34.7% to 34.7%, Labour would end up with 364 seats to the Tories’ 224. Labour could have won
a parliamentary majority with 3.7% less of the vote than the Conservatives. This eliminated the incentive for
Labour to reform the electoral system, as it had planned to do when it was in opposition. Conservatives, based
on their historical success with SMP and their ideological desire for clear majorities in parliament, continued to
advocate for SMP against their own best interest. Only the perennially third-place Liberal Democrats advocated
for reform.
Electoral reform did come to the UK, but not for national elections. The New Labour government of
1997 devolved powers to Scotland, Wales, and London, giving more autonomy to the regional assemblies. All
three use a mixed system of plurality and PR seats. Elections to the European Parliament are conducted using
List PR (except in Northern Ireland, where they continue to use Single Transferable Vote). The use of PR has
created a competitive multi-party race for the EP, including representation from the Green party and UKIP (a
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Euro-skeptic party in favor of leaving the EU). Recent proposals to democratize the House of Lords have
suggested using STV or List PR. The fact that SMP is no longer in the discussion for future electoral reforms,
such as proposals for Scottish local governments or English regional elections, suggests that using devolved
assemblies and the EP elections as a “laboratory” for new electoral systems has changed voters’ perceptions of
how officials ought to be elected, and may produce a significant enough cultural shift to renew interest in
national electoral reform.
Dunleavy and Margetts (2001) see the changes in the UK’s political system as an irreversible process.
They offer three potential explanations: a “Democratic reappraisal” coupled with policy learning, long-run
dynamics undermining “British exceptionalism,” and short-term dynamics and political convenience. One of
two futures is inevitable; either a national plurality system will co-exist with proportional second-order
elections, or the influence of proportionality will erode the historical foundations of plurality voting, leading to
a national reform in both the electoral and party system.
Exemplifying the elite-centered, consequence-driven nature of second wave analysis is Richard Katz
(2005). Katz suggests that the causes of reform go largely unstudied, but three interrelated questions sit at the
heart of any attempt to understand reform. First, why does reform happen at all, when the parties with the
power to reform the rules are the beneficiaries of the status quo? Second, when do reforms take place? And
third, how is the system reformed (and what is it reformed into)? Katz addresses the first question, but leaves
the last two open for future study. In Katz’s view, there are six reasons why a party in power would seek to
reform the electoral system:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The party in power believes the existing system will threaten their continued victory.
The party in power is not totally in control of the reform process, and can have reform imposed upon
them from other institutions or groups.
A coalition in power may have a diversity of interests.
A party may misjudge their expected gains from electoral reform.
Parties may value the long-term consequences of reform over the short-term costs.
Parties may be willing to concede to electoral reform in exchange for other policy objectives.

Katz’s list is heavily focused on elites and consequences, but the beginnings of a more comprehensive analysis
of electoral reform are starting to show through. Katz acknowledges that parties may misjudge their expected
gains, or that they may not be in control of the process. From these holes in the dyke of second wave analysis, a
flood a third wave ideas can be wrought.
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The Third Wave: Shugart, Flinders, and Beyond
Matthew Shugart (2008) begins to look for the origins of electoral reform in the interplay between the inherent
aspects of an electoral system and in elite behaviors that are contingent on both the consequences and the
politics of reform. Figure 1 illustrates Shugart’s conception of the reform process.
Figure 1: The Electoral Reform Process
Source: Shugart 2008, 16

Inherent
Conditions

Systemic Failure

Anomalous
Outcome

Reform Process

Act Contingency
or Outcome
Contingency

Shugart argues that the inherent conditions of a Majority/Plurality electoral system will inevitably lead
to a systemic failure that manifests itself in the form of an anomalous outcome. Anomalous outcomes include
“upside down pluralities” (the national vote “winner” doesn’t win the most seats) or “lopsided victories” (a
party with a narrow electoral margin wins a disproportionately large number of seats). These anomalous
outcomes will lead to public outcry for reform. The incumbent party, wishing to benefit from the popularity of
a pro-reform position, may enact electoral reforms (Shugart calls this act-contingent behavior). Or, a party may
eventually gain power after previously being the victim of an anomalous outcome, and will take the opportunity
to initiate a reform that would prevent future anomalies (Shugart classifies this “outcome-contingent behavior”).
Shugart believes that electoral reform only occurs in cases where anomalous outcomes drive act-contingent or
outcome-contingent behavior from the governing parties.
Shugart’s model of reform is not without weakness. Majority/Plurality electoral systems are designed
to produce clear winners and losers. Disproportionate outcomes are not anomalies, but intentional mechanisms
for this end. Likewise, there is nothing anomalous about an upside-down plurality. The system is founded on a
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constituency-based winner-take-all principle. As long as the top vote-getter in each district was elected, the
relationship between the national vote-share and the national seat-share is irrelevant. These are, as Shugart
points out, the “inherent conditions” of a plurality system. Why, then, would voters suddenly decide that these
outcomes are “anomalous?” All Majority/Plurality elections produce disproportionate outcomes; how lopsided
is lopsided enough to declare the outcome anomalous? Shugart provides no criteria for determining this
“tipping point.”
Flinders (2010) picks up where Shugart and Katz leave off by tying electoral reform to changes in
political culture (Flinders 2010, 41). Flinders argues that the reform process begins when the electorate shifts
from majoritarian political values to consensus political values. That shift in values causes the current electoral
system to produce outcomes that are out of step with the expectations of the electorate. The public then calls
for electoral reform, initiating a four-step reform process (Table 2). Each step represents an opportunity for the
governing party or coalition to insert an obstacle to (or kill outright) the reform effort. Successful navigation of
these “veto points” requires two necessary conditions: an ideational shift in the governing parties, and a
constitutional entrepreneur.
Table 2: Four Stages of Electoral Reform
Source: Flinders, 2010: 47
Stages of Reform

Description

Pressure

Reform enters the policy agenda due after a systemic
failure leads to public outcry.

Recognition

The governing party/executive makes a strategic
calculation that leads them to support or oppose
reform.

Initiation and Consultation

The government creates an “arm’s length” body to
review the electoral system and recommend a
reform.

Decision Making

The reform recommendations are put to a vote in the
legislature or via referendum.

The Pressure stage hinges on public outcry, often due to a systemic failure in the existing electoral
system (as Shugart contends). But systemic failure is, as Flinders notes, a normative judgment. The
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disproportionalities and manufactured majorities of SMP are not an accident, but represent a trade-off between
representativeness and stability that conforms to the political cultural values of a majoritarian democracy. This
means the Pressure stage must be evaluated within a broader social context. The source of public demand for
reform cannot be explained by systemic failure alone; cultural values must shift such that the distorted outcomes
of SMP come to be seen as a systemic failure by the voters, and the source of that shift in values must be
understood. Flinders’ argument runs counter to that of Shugart, who argues that SMP was not designed with
manufactured majorities in mind, but instead originated in a pre-democratic era to ensure constituency
representation. Shugart declares that lopsided majorities and “plurality reversals” resulting from the mechanics
of SMP are a sufficient explanation for the initiation of electoral reform (Shugart 2008, 13).
The Recognition stage does not necessarily flow from the Pressure stage. As Katz noted above, it is
not necessarily rational for political parties that benefit from the status quo to pursue a reform agenda. In trying
to understand the rational basis for governing parties to pursue reform, Flinders points to the difference between
outcome-contingent and act-contingent factors in rational strategy (Flinders 2010, 46). Outcome-contingent
factors give incumbents an incentive to engage in reform because the incumbents will stand to gain from the
outcome of the reform effort. For example, an incumbent party that is experiencing diminishing electoral
support over time may support a more proportional electoral system to hedge against getting squeezed out of the
party system by up and coming parties. Act-contingent factors are those that encourage an incumbent party to
be seen as pro-reform, even if the outcome of reform is unknown. The public outcry expressed in the Pressure
stage may be one such act-contingent factor. Other possible factors, such as policy momentum or a strong
ideological platform that supersedes rational action, can also encourage parties to engage in reform. An
analysis of the strategic incentives of the parties is insufficient to understand the Recognition stage; broader
political and social factors must also be examined.
The Initiation and Consultation stage can be seen two ways. Because legislatures are often free to
simply vote up or down on the adoption of a new electoral system, the creation of an independent panel or
review committee can be seen as the introduction of a new veto point designed to give the government political
cover if it decides not to adopt reform. On the other hand, an independent body lends the reform process
democratic legitimacy, and makes a future reversal of electoral reform politically untenable. The formation of
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an independent body, outside of the direct control of the legislature, also serves a symbolic function. It
represents a threshold of seriousness regarding the reform effort, which gives the government the appearance of
being pro-reform. However, the decisions of these bodies are rarely binding; despite appearances, these bodies
allow the government to control the time-table for the consultation process as well as the manner in which the
recommendations are released. That control, while politically useful, nonetheless represents a trade-off; the
Initiation stage creates the expectation among the public that a decision will soon follow, preventing the
government from being able to table the reform question indefinitely (the composition of the body may also
determine what kind of reform is recommended, which can help or hurt its chances of passage. See Lundberg
2007).
The Decision Making stage may seem like the simplest, but hidden in its details are a number of
potential veto points. Reforms can be decided on by a legislative vote, executive fiat, a public referendum, or
some mixture of these. The outcome may be contingent on the strength of the public information campaign,
changes in the political context that may affect the salience of the issue, or in various legal thresholds. For
example, the BC-STV reform failed because it needed to cross a double-threshold: 60% of the vote provincewide, and a majority vote in 60% of the ridings. It failed to cross the first threshold, despite succeeding in the
second.
Flinders examines the reform process in British Columbia, Canada in 2007-9 and the UK in 1997. He
found that the UK did not experience a Pressure stage, nor did they reach the Decision Making stage (since
publication, the UK has held a referendum on changing the electoral system to AV; it failed). BC achieved all
four stages of the process, but the referendum in the Decision Making stage failed to pass, as described above.
A second referendum was held two years later, which was defeated by an even higher margin. In the case of the
UK, there was no agent to guide the reform process through various veto opportunities, nor was there an
ideational shift in the governing parties toward a more consensual model of democracy. The BC-STV reform
movement did have a constitutional agent to support it in BC Liberal Party leader Gordon Campbell, but there
was no ideational shift in the Liberal party. Flinders proposes that the combination of a constitutional
entrepreneur and an ideational shift together are necessary conditions of electoral reform. As a point of
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comparison, Flinders indicates that New Zealand had both an ideational shift and a political agent to promote
reform in its successful transition from SMP to MMP.
Flinders does not, however, give New Zealand the full case-study treatment, as he does BC and the
UK. The depth of his analysis is on two cases of electoral reform failure, which constitutes case selection on
the dependent variable (a common mistake in comparative political science, but nonetheless a mistake that can
taint the study with selection bias; see Geddes 1990). A more rigorous test of Flinders’ analytical framework of
the electoral reform process requires a case-study analysis of both failed and successful “majoritarian
modifications.” Rather than summarize the New Zealand reform process in three paragraphs, a full case-study
ought to be undertaken. In addition, case-studies of reform efforts outside the British Commonwealth ought to
be conducted, to increase the versatility of Flinders’ findings (or else to define their limits). Because Flinders
limits himself to majoritarian modification, he excludes an entire universe of cases that could strengthen his
argument. His model requires modification if it is to be applied to consensus-modifications (Italy in 2004), or
cases of within-family reform (Japan in 1994, for example).
Beyond these failings, Flinders opens the door to a more context-based approach to the study of
electoral reform. Flinders’ framework for understanding electoral reform begins with a structural/process-based
analysis, but seeks to embed each stage of that process within the broader political, social, and cultural context
of each country undertaking reform. By looking beyond the strategic calculations of the relevant actors,
Flinders was able to identify the importance of ideational change and political agency in the reform process.
The limits of the utility of this approach will not be known until a broader selection of cases are analyzed under
this framework. A closer look at a wider variety of reform efforts, both successful and failed, is the logical next
step.
While Flinders takes a limited view of electoral reform in the context of majoritarian modification,
Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) have decided to widen the scope of reform analysis. They propose a new
framework for classifying electoral reform that will eliminate the “moving target” definition and give all
authors a common basis from which to work. Jacobs and Leyenaar begin with Lijphart’s classic definition of
reform (1994), which included changes in the electoral formula, and changes in district magnitude or effective
threshold greater than 20%. Jacobs and Leyenaar reclassify Lijphart’s definition as “major reform,” then add
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criteria for two more categories, minor reform and technical reform. Reform is evaluated along five
dimensions: proportionality, election levels, inclusiveness, ballot structure, and procedures. A change in any of
the five dimensions qualifies as reform, and multi-dimensional reforms are measured at the highest level (for
example, one major reform coupled with ten technical reforms is collectively classified as a major reform).
Proportionality concerns the electoral formula (or family), as well as district magnitude and the
effective thresholds for election. Changes between families of electoral system at the national level are major
reforms; changes within families or changes at the sub-national level are minor. Changes in DM or effective
threshold beyond 20% are major reforms, whereas changes from 1%-20% are minor and changes less than 1%
are technical. Redistricting that affect more than 1% of the population are minor, and less than 1% are
technical.
Major reform along the dimension of election levels occurs only when the direct election of a head of
state is introduced or abolished. Minor reform occurs when the direct election of any other figure affecting
more than 1% of the population is introduced, or when a new layer of elections are added or removed affecting
more than 1% of voters. Technical reform occurs when either of these two changes affects less than 1% of the
population.
Inclusiveness measures expansion of the electorate, changes in registration laws, and changes in
compulsory voting. An expansion of the electorate beyond 20% or the introduction or abolishment of
compulsory voting represent major reform. Minor reform occurs when voter registration changes from cost to
no-cost (or vice versa), or when there are changes in the enforcement rules of compulsory voting. An expansion
of the electorate between 1%-20% also constitutes minor reform. Technical reform refers to a less than 1%
expansion in the electorate, as well as changes to the registration or compulsory voting laws beyond categorical
shifts.
Major reforms to ballot structure would include a change in the type of ballot (individual, preference,
party, or multi-vote), or changes in candidate quota laws that affect more than 20% of candidates. Changes in
party-registration laws that affect more than 20% of parties also constitute a major reform. Minor reforms
consist of these same changes, affecting 1%-20% of candidates or parties, and technical reforms affect less than
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1%. The final dimension, electoral procedures, concerns the governing bodies of an election. Major reforms
are not possible; minor reforms occur when an electoral managing body (EMB) changes from independent to
government run (or vice versa). Technical reforms include all other changes to EMB structures and rules.
While Jacobs and Leyenaar are exhaustive in categorizing the “what” of reforms, Renwick (2011)
looks to be equally exhaustive in categorizing the “who” and “why” of reform: the actors and their motivations.
Renwick identifies six categories of electoral reform defined by their primary actor, on a spectrum from citizen
dominated to politician dominated (2011, 457). The most citizen dominated type of reform is Mass Imposition,
in which citizens impose reform independent of politicians. In Active Mass Impetus reforms, a mobilized
public force politicians to initiate reform. In Passive Mass Impetus reforms, politicians seek public approval by
initiating reform efforts reflective of the public’s desire for change (what Shugart called act-contingent
behavior). Mass Constraint reforms occur when politicians attempt to reform the system, but the scope of
reform is constrained by negative public sentiment. Finally, the most politician-dominated reform is the Elite
Imposition reform, in which politicians impose reform against public will. Renwick contends that Mass
Imposition and Elite Imposition are uncommon; most reforms occur in the space of interactions between elites
and the masses, with one side or another dominating the effort. Given these assumptions, Renwick tests a series
of theoretical propositions about reform using all cases of major reform in Europe since 1945.
Rahat and Hazan (2011) also shift their attention away from the consequences of reform, and toward
the process itself. They propose a framework for analyzing the success and failure of electoral reform
initiatives by focusing on a series of barriers that all reform efforts must overcome. Their analysis of electoral
reform concerns not the source of desire for reform, but the source of the obstacles to reform. They also
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the various barriers, and propose ways to overcome each of them.
Barriers to electoral reform can be broadly categorized as legal, cultural, sociological, systemic, seatmaximizing, veto-players, and game-theoretic.
Rahat and Hazan’s focus on barriers is a call-back to the elite-centered analysis of the first two waves,
as most of the barriers either address the interests of elites, or require the institutional power of elites to
overcome. Conversely, Pippa Norris (2011) analyzes electoral reform from the perspective of a mass-elite
partnership. She models electoral reform as a policy cycle in which the masses push reform onto the public
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agenda in response to dissatisfaction with the legitimacy of the current system (2011, 536-7). The public
agenda filters through the media, parties, and interest groups until it arrives on the policy agenda. Elites then
debate reform and, if it is rational to do so from an act-contingent or outcome-contingent standpoint, implement
it. After a series of elections, the consequences of reform feed back to the masses, whose satisfaction or
dissatisfaction will restart the cycle. This policy cycle framework allows for a broader set of actors and
contexts to be considered when evaluating the sources of electoral reform, but it always begins with a massdriven sense that public institutions have lost legitimacy.
Implications of the Third Wave
The new frameworks of analysis emerging from the third wave of electoral reforms research allow
scholars to tackle the lingering questions of electoral reform in a new way. One such question concerns the
conditions resulting in the success or failure of a reform effort. Why does a viable reform effort sometimes
succeed and sometimes fail? An answer to this question requires the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A definition of “electoral reform.”
A definition of “viable.”
A definition of “successful” and “failed.”
Potential explanatory variables for analysis.

One potential explanation for the likelihood of success or failure of a reform would be based on how mass- or
elite-dominated the source of that reform is. If Rahat and Hazan are correct in their emphasis on the barriers to
reform, then efforts that are more elite-driven ought to have a higher success rate than mass-driven efforts.
Norris’s policy cycle model of reform suggests that all reform efforts contain elements of both massmobilization and elite bargaining, but by her own admission, the cycle says nothing about the relative
importance of each actor. In line with Flinders’ (2010) argument that constitutional entrepreneurs and ideational
change among the political-actor class parties are necessary conditions for reform, I hypothesize that among
major reforms, elite-driven processes will be more likely to contribute to a successful reform effort than massdriven processes.
While the underlying logic that an elite-driven process will more likely succeed is similar to the logic
that suggests a constitutional entrepreneur and ideational change is necessary for reform (as posited by
Flinders), these variables of analysis are not synonymous. A mass-driven reform process can still be supported
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by a constitutional entrepreneur (as we will see in several of our Canadian case studies), and ideational change
in the political elite can happen in both elite- and mass-driven reforms. For this reason, I will retain Flinders’
two hypotheses (that reforms are more likely to succeed when a constitutional entrepreneur and ideational
change in the governing party are present), in addition to the hypothesis that elite driven reforms are more likely
to succeed.
Rahat and Hazan (2011, 491) suggest that their “barriers” approach to analyzing electoral reform ought
to be studied alongside a cross-cutting dimension, such as Jacobs and Leyenaar’s (2011, 497) conceptualization
of major, minor, and technical reform. The rationale is that there may be fewer barriers, or the barriers may be
more easily navigated, for reforms that are minor or technical as opposed to major (because a smaller portion of
the electorate is impacted, and the political stakes are therefore lower). Jacobs and Leyenaar classify any
reform in which the electoral system category is changed at the national level as a “major reform.” Electoral
system category changes below the national level are considered minor reforms 2 (ibid, 501). The introduction
of a new layer of government below the national level is also considered a minor reform, as is the introduction
of the direct election of public figures below the national level (when these introductions impact less than 1% of
the electorate, they are instead considered “technical” reforms). In a case study of minor reform in the
Netherlands, Jacobs and Leyenaar find that some of the barriers to reform characterized by Rahat and Hazan
were “significantly lower than others or virtually non-existent” and that minor reforms may have more room for
“ideology, personal convictions…and demands of special interest groups” than the traditional theories of major
reform, which rely more on a rational-strategic analysis (ibid, 509). Based on that analysis, I hypothesize that
subnational electoral system reform efforts will be more likely to succeed than reform efforts at the national
level.

2

Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011, Endnote 9) attempt to further parse this distinction by arguing that in federal
systems with “significant competences for the regions”, changes to the electoral system category ought to be
considered major reforms on par with a national reform. I find this reasoning incongruous with their
arguments that the introduction of a new layer of elected government, or the introduction of direct elections
of public figures below the national level, would still be considered minor reforms. My research will adopt a
more parsimonious approach, and consider all reforms at the subnational level as “minor.” However, I will
explore Jacobs and Leyenaar’s exemption for subnational reforms in federal states in the Discussion.
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Methodology
Expanding upon the work of Flinders (2010) by integrating the theoretical propositions of Renwick
(2011), Norris (2011), Rahat and Hazan (2011), and Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011), I propose to start with four
hypotheses for analysis:
H1: Electoral reforms that meet the criteria of Majoritarian Modification (Y) will be more likely to succeed if a
Constitutional Entrepreneur (X1) is present.
H2: Electoral reforms that meet the criteria of Majoritarian Modification (Y) will be more likely to succeed if
ideational change in the political elite (X2) is present.
H3: Electoral reforms that meet the criteria of Majoritarian Modification (Y) will be more likely to succeed if
the reform process is dominated by politicians (elite-driven) rather than citizens (mass-driven) (X3).
H4: Electoral reforms that meet the criteria of Majoritarian Modification (Y) will be more likely to succeed at
the subnational level than at the national level (X4).

Examining the independent predictive power of the above hypotheses is only the first step. The goal of this
research is not to demonstrate that any of the above conditions are necessary or sufficient to ensure the success
of an electoral reform effort. The goal is to contribute to the development of an explanatory theory of
successful electoral reform by understanding how the relationship between the rational-strategic, institutional,
and political-cultural factors captured in the hypotheses above contribute to a context and process for electoral
reform that increases the likelihood of success. This will require that the four proposed explanatory variables be
considered in combination, using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (see Case Selection).
Defining the Dependent Variable (Y)
The ultimate goal of this research is to contribute to the development of an explanatory theory of those
electoral system reforms identified as majoritarian modifications. I define majoritarian modification as a subset
of electoral system reform in which a government with an historically majoritarian political system adopts an
electoral system that typically results in a more consensual political system 3. A more consensual political
system is one in which the electoral system produces more proportional outcomes, or (in the case of moving
from SMP to AV, for example), more voter choice and more “accommodatory and cooperative politics”

3

For a detailed explanations of “majoritarian” and “consensual” political systems, see Lijphart, 1999: 1-8

27
(Reynolds et al. 2008, 49). The dependent variable (Y) is the outcome of majoritarian modification, which is a
nominal variable with two values: success and failure. Success is defined as the adoption of the proposed
electoral system reform for one or more consecutive elections (Norris 2011, 540). Failure is defined as the nonadoption of the proposed reform, due to abandonment by the government, defeat in a legislative vote or
referendum, or any other means.
Defining Explanatory Variables (X1-X4)
This research investigates four explanatory variables for the success or failure of majoritarian
modification. The first two variables, the presence of a constitutional entrepreneur and the presence of
ideational change in the governing parties, are from the original investigation by Flinders. A constitutional
entrepreneur is a political agent who is “strategically located…at the forefront of the political system acting as a
driving force” for electoral reform (Flinders 2010, 53). Flinders argues that such agents are a necessary
condition of majoritarian modification, because electoral reforms have a redistributive effect on the power
structure of existing parties/politicians, and therefore it is in the strategic interests of those elites to block
reform. The various capacities of elites to prevent reform represent the veto points, or barriers, of the reform
process (Rahat and Hazan 2011, 488). Flinders argues that, when evaluating electoral reform in terms of the
relationship between the structure of the political system, the context in which reform is attempted, and the
agency of those in the reform process, it becomes clear that the presence of a constitutional entrepreneur who
can navigate those barriers to reform is a necessary condition for the success of that reform (Flinders 2010, 54).
The presence of a constitutional entrepreneur (X1) is a nominal variable with two values: yes (present) and no
(not present).
The second explanatory variable investigated by Flinders (and further investigated here) is the
presence of ideational change in the governing parties. Flinders argues that the context in which electoral
reform is attempted is one determining factor in the eventual success or failure of that reform. Majoritarian
electoral systems produce outcomes that are consistent with the values of majoritarian political systems.
Majoritarian modification cannot occur unless the political culture of the governing parties changes sufficiently
to accommodate those consensual political values embodied by the new electoral system. While the presence of
a constitutional entrepreneur helps the reform effort navigate the veto points of the reform process, the presence

28
of ideational change among the governing parties decreases the number of veto points that the reform effort will
encounter, lowering the barriers to reform. Ideational change (X2) is a nominal variable with two values: yes
(change is present) and no (change is not present).
To supplement Flinders’ work, this research will introduce two additional explanatory variables. The
first of these is the primary actor in the reform process (X3). Renwick (2010, 20) initially identified two types
of reform processes in established democracies: elite majority imposition (in which politicians impose electoral
reform on citizens) and elite mass interaction (in which politicians and citizens interact in the reform process).
He later developed this dichotomy into six types of electoral reform processes, representing a scale from
politician-dominated to citizen-dominated (Renwick 2011, 457). Renwick argues that previous research into
electoral reform has assumed that politicians always dominate the process, and that the majority of electoral
reforms in Europe since 1945 would support that assumption. But more recent electoral reforms (Italy, Japan,
and New Zealand) and attempted reforms (Canada) have demonstrated the presence of elite-mass interactions in
which politicians and citizens share varying degrees of influence in the electoral reform process.
What is unexplored in Renwick’s analysis is the degree to which the success or failure of electoral
reform is related to the degree of influence that either politicians or citizens have in these elite-mass
interactions. One possible expectation would be that the more politicians dominate the reform process, the
more institutional power the reform effort will have behind it and the fewer barriers it will face in order to
succeed, thereby increasing its likelihood of success. A competing expectation would be that the more citizens
dominate the reform process, the more politicians are constrained by mass-expectations into adopting actcontingent behavior. In other words, the popularity of potential reform, as evidenced by the participation of
citizens in the reform process, may force politicians to have to appear to be pro-reform in order to maintain their
mass appeal. Therefore, citizen-dominated reform efforts ought to have a higher likelihood of success.
Either possibility seems equally plausible. In order to test the explanatory power of the primary actor
in the reform process, Renwick’s scale of politician-citizen dominance must be recoded as a dichotomous
variable. Cases which fall under Renwick’s categories of Mass Imposition and Active Mass Impetus (Renwick,
2011, 457) will be recoded as Citizen Dominated. Cases which fall under Elite Imposition will be coded as
Politician Dominated. Cases that fall under Mass Constraint or Passive Mass Impetus will require interpretation

29
of their specific contexts in order to classify them as either politician or citizen dominated. The end result will
be a nominal variable (Primary Actor) with two values: mass (citizens) and elites (politicians). For the purposes
of this research, I will hypothesize that the elite-driven reforms will be more likely to succeed, by the same
logic that ideational change in the governing parties would be more likely to result in success reform efforts;
elites have more veto power in the process, and therefore an elite-driven process would logically face fewer
barriers to success.
The fourth explanatory variable investigated will be Level of Government (X4), a nominal variable
with two values: national and subnational. Reforms targeted at elections to the national legislature will be
coded as national reform efforts. Reforms targeted at elections to subnational legislatures (Canadian provincial
elections, elections to the Scottish or Welsh Assemblies, etc.) will be coded as subnational reform efforts.
While the definition of the variable is self-evident, the theoretical underpinning for its use as an
explanatory factor in the success of electoral reform requires some explanation. Katz (2005, 59-60)
distinguished between two types of electoral reform: major and minor. He classified electoral system reforms at
the subnational level as a type of minor reform, and went on to argue that because minor reforms are less
extensive and face fewer barriers to success, they ought to be more likely to succeed. Jacobs and Leyenaar
(2011, 509) concur, finding in the one case of minor reform they examined that “some barriers were
significantly lower than others or were virtually non-existent.” If the barriers to reform are lower in minor
electoral reform efforts, then Level of Government ought to have some explanatory power in the success or
failure of majoritarian modification.
In the special case of UK elections to the European Parliament (a supranational body), the reform
effort will be coded alongside the subnational reform efforts (as opposed to the national reform efforts). While
elections to the European Parliament are nation-wide, and the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) are
meant to represent the interests of the UK as a whole in European affairs, voter engagement with the European
Parliament is low, and MEPs have at best a second-order impact on the governance of the UK. Research shows
that voter choice in MEPs is dictated more by the politics of the individual member states than by any set of
European issues (Norris 1997; Schmitt 2005), and that the European Parliament can be best understood as “a
common political sub-system of its member states” (Reif 1997, 116). Because of low voter engagement and
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low impact on national governance, the barriers to electoral reform ought to be lower than in elections to
national bodies (according to the logic of Katz and Jacobs and Leyenaar in discussing subnational elections).
For the purposes of this research, UK elections to the European Parliament will be categorized the same as
subnational elections.
By learning what values of these four explanatory variables, in what combinations, correspond to
success or failure in cases of attempted majoritarian modification, an explanatory theory of majoritarian
modification may be developed. But identifying the explanatory variables in question is only the first step; the
next is to determine the criteria by which cases are selected.
Case Selection
The ideal research design to test these hypotheses would be a large-N analysis of the entire universe of
viable reform efforts. Such an analysis would require a herculean effort of data collection, as every legislative
session, election, and official report from every national and subnational government would have to be
documented and categorized for the entire time period in question. Such an effort would be foolhardy without
first exploring the potential of the hypotheses. A random sample of cases (or of countries from which to draw
cases) would be the most statistically sound method of exploring the hypotheses for viability. But many
countries that would qualify for such a sample would prove difficult to collect data from due to language
barriers, and a lack of readily available primary documents (at least in digital form; travelling to the countries in
question to examine documents first-hand is well beyond the scope of this research and means of the
researcher).
The method of research design I propose for exploring the viability of my hypotheses is inductive
analysis through Qualitative Comparative Analysis of case studies (see Bernard 2006, 544-8; Hopkin 2010,
303-305; Marx et al. 2014; and Ragin n.d.), focusing on comparable cases to control for extraneous variables
(see Collier 1991; Lipjart 1971). Inductive analysis is a qualitative research technique in which a hypothesis is
examined in light of a single case. If that case conforms to the expectations of the hypothesis, another case is
examined, until the enumeration of positive cases has confirmed the hypothesis to the researcher’s satisfaction.
If a case is examined which fails to conform to the expectations of the hypothesis, than the hypothesis is either
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discarded or expanded and redefined to fit the results of the negative case study (Bernard 2006, 544). While
proof through the enumeration of cases is not a statistically rigorous method of confirming hypotheses, it does
help determine whether a hypothesis has enough potential viability to justify a larger-scale investigation.
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) has seen significant adoption as a political science research
methodology since 1987 (Marx et al. 2014, 125). Developed by sociologist and political scientist Charles
Ragin, its goal is to bridge the divide of qualitative and quantitative analysis by using the quantitative rigor of
analysis based on Boolean algebra and set theory to study the different combinations of theoretically causal
conditions that result in similar outcomes across cases, as illuminated by the in-depth (qualitative) analysis of
those cases. It is a useful methodology for studies with a sample size too small for fully quantitative analyses
like regression (samples between 5-50 are ideal). With a smaller, more deeply understood set of cases, QCA
can be used to examine the relationship of explanatory variables in terms of their logical necessity and/or
sufficiency to a particular outcome, as opposed to a simple set of correlations (Ragin n.d.).
For my research, I will examine all cases of viable reform effort in three countries: Canada, New
Zealand, and the U.K. In all research, non-random case selection must be justified. The justifications for
selecting cases from these countries are three-fold. One, language is a barrier to research, limiting me to cases
from primarily English-speaking countries. Two, a valid comparison of cases requires as much control of
extraneous variables as possible, leading me to choose three countries with similar political systems, political
cultures, and a shared historical experience. To address the problem in comparative politics that Lipjart and
others have identified as “many variables, small N” (Collier 1991, 16-17), I used Lipjart’s recommendation of
choosing “comparable cases” that are “similar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which
one wants to treat as constant, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to
each other” (Lipjart 1971, 687). Finally, determining whether a reform effort was mass-driven or elite-driven
will be more successful for cases in countries which have been the subject of extensive analysis already. There
is a preponderance of literature on reforms in these three countries already, which makes them ideal candidates
for categorization and analysis. Inductive analysis is best used to test hypotheses using “easy” cases, before any
major investment is made in compiling a large-N dataset.
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Flinders began his inquiry into majoritarian modification by looking at two cases: the failure of the
BC-STV campaign in 2005, and the failure of the Jenkins Commission in the UK in 1997. He determined that
the absence of ideational change in both cases resulted in their failure, but “[t]he logic of comparative analysis
encourages us to further confirm this thesis by identifying a polity where ideational and cultural change did
occur and therefore reform was implemented” (Flinders 2010, 54). He chose New Zealand’s 1994 adoption of
MMP as the positive case for comparison.
Having already expanded Flinders’ explanatory variables, we can also expand his case selection. In
addition to examining British Columbia, we can examine all the reforms in Canada contemporaneous with the
BC effort (PEI, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and reform of national elections). In addition to looking at
the Jenkins Commission, we can look at the subsequent subnational reforms (Scotland, Wales, and the Greater
London Assembly), the AV referendum of 2011, and the adoption of PR for European Parliament elections.
Finally, in addition to the national reform in New Zealand in 1994, we can briefly discuss the attempt to repeal
that reform in 2011 (although that reform effort does not meet the criteria of analysis for this research; see Case
Studies: New Zealand for details).
The time period for case selection will be limited to 1991-2011. This will capture the possible
demonstration effect of the post-Communist democracies that experimented with different electoral systems,
paving the way for the acceptability of such reforms. Proving the existence of such a demonstration effect is
not the purpose of this research; by only looking at cases after 1991, we control for any possible difference
created by the end of the Cold War, without leaving too many potential cases unexamined. Study will be
limited to those reform efforts that had some measure of viability: for our purposes, viability will be defined as
the legitimization of the reform effort through the commissioning of a government study, creation of a
committee or other consultative body to study reform, or a referendum, legislative vote, executive fiat, or
judicial order attempting to implement reform. This definition of viability presents the possibility of selection
bias, as any reform effort that reaches these targets would seem to be well on its way to success. But the
outcomes of our selected cases do not bear out this possibility: of the thirteen cases that meet the criteria for
study, only five resulted in successful reform.
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Procedure of Analysis
Having defined the dependent variable (Y), four possible explanatory variables (Xz-X4), and the cases
for analysis (N=13), the next step will be to measure the values of X1, X2, X3, X4, and Y in each case. I do so in
the case studies that follow. Having measured the values of the independent and dependent variables in the
sample data, I will calculate the Proportional Reduction of Error of the modal value of each variable, to measure
the predictive power of each explanatory variable in isolation. Following that isolated analysis, I will convert
the results of the case studies into a Truth Table, and use QCA to analyze the results. This analysis will answer
the following questions:
1.

What combinations of values of X1-X4 are not present among the cases selected (gaps in analysis,
called “logical remainders”)?

2.

What combinations of values of X1-X4 are present when Y = “Success”?

3.

What combinations of values result in cases of both success and failure (called “logical
contradictions”)?

4.

Does the outcome of the analysis support the proposed hypotheses, or validate the underlying
theoretical rationale for those hypotheses?

From this analysis, I hope to draw conclusions about what variables in what combinations have predictive
power for successful reform outcomes, what variables are missing from the analysis that could help explain any
contradictory results, and what further study would be necessary to advance a more comprehensive
understanding of majoritarian modification.
The categorization of case studies for analysis will begin with a series of cases in which no viable
reform effort was able to succeed: the national and subnational reform efforts in Canada. From there the
research will examine the mixed record of reform efforts in the UK, followed finally by the success of New
Zealand.
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Case Studies: Canada
National Reform
As with other Commonwealth countries, Canada inherited SMP from Britain two centuries ago. But
given Canada’s expansive territory and many linguistic, ethnic, and cultural divisions, “first-past-the-post…was
never really appropriate to the Canadian polity” (LeDuc 2009, 21). Canada ought to be fertile ground for
electoral reform; as Andrew Heard (2012, 1) puts it, “Virtually every election provides fresh fodder for calls for
electoral reform, to ensure that representation in Parliament reflects the wishes of voters.” Heard cites the 2004
federal elections, in which Conservatives won 13 of 14 seats in Saskatchewan with just 42% of the provincial
popular vote, while NDP saw a net loss of two seats despite increasing its popular vote total by 5% from the
previous election. These “anomalous outcomes” (Shugart 2008, 16), are the sources of unhappiness among the
electorate that spur lawmakers to attempt electoral reform.
At the national level, such a reform effort can be found in the recommendations of the (now defunct)
Law Commission of Canada, which, after two years of research and consultation, submitted a proposal for
electoral reform to the Minister of Justice in 2004. The report described Canada as being in the midst of a
decade-long “democratic malaise” of decreasing political trust, declining voter turnout, and growing disconnect
between youth and politics (Law Commission 2004, xiii). The intention of the Commission’s report was to
appease the electorate’s concerns about the future of Canadian democracy by reforming the formula for
converting votes to seats, as is evidenced by the introductory remarks:
Throughout its consultation process, the Commission has heard about how much Canadians care about
their democracy; about their desire to participate in the system of governance; and about how seriously
they take their role as voters and citizens. They explained why the current system leaves them feeling
indifferent and why many do not vote, and they expressed their interest in political participation—in
contributing to and energizing Canadian democracy. The many voices heard throughout the engagement
process are reflected in this Report.
(Law Commission 2004, viii)
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Electoral reform in Canada, at the national level, represents a response to public pressure, as opposed to the
purely strategic machinations of the political elite. The report concludes that the best way to engage a
growingly disengaged electorate is to add an element of proportionality to the electoral system by adopting
MMP.
Primary Actor
Renwick broadly classifies the various Canadian electoral reform efforts as examples of “Passive Mass
Impetus,” in which “voters do not mobilise [sic] around electoral reform, but politicians nevertheless seek to
respond to public opinion by proposing reform measures” (Renwick 2011, 458). For Renwick, this type of
reform effort does not fall neatly under the categories of “citizen dominated” or “politician dominated,” but
instead falls into a murkier category of “elite-mass interaction” (ibid). I agree with Renwick’s assessment that
the Law Commission’s recommendation represents an elite-mass interaction, but I would conclude that it leans
toward a citizen-dominated reform effort. The Law Commission report makes 23 recommendations for
designing, implementing, and monitoring an MMP electoral system for the Canadian parliament (Law
Commission 2004, 175-80). These recommendations are designed to increase proportionality, promote
representation among women, minorities, aboriginal groups, and youth, and adequately balance constituency
representation with party representation. The report also calls for a federal department to engage in “an ongoing
dialogue with Canadians and citizen’s groups on issues of democratic performance…” (Law Commission 2004,
180). None of these recommendations would benefit the existing power structure of political elites per se,
except insofar as the reforms would increase the popularity of those elites supporting reform among the
electorate. The overall consequences of the proposed reforms would be largely negative for the current powerholders, decreasing the manufactured majorities of the parties in power and replacing much of the white- and
male-dominated parliament with woman and minority legislators. The source of the reform recommendations is
public dissatisfaction, and the likely outcomes of reform are an increased proportionality of representation at the
expense of the current political elite. Under these circumstances, it is fair to characterize this reform effort as
citizen-dominated.
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Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
Liberal party member Paul Martin became Prime Minister at the end of 2003, succeeding Jean
Chretien. Martin campaigned for the position in part by promising to continue the work of “democratic
renewal” started by Chretien in order to address what he called Canada’s “democratic deficit” (LeDuc 2009,
23). Electoral reform was one of many changes Martin sought to implement, but his efforts were stymied by
the results of the June 2004 election, which reduced the Liberal party to a minority government. Two years
later, the Liberal government fell and was replaced by a minority Conservative government under Stephen
Harper. For six months, Martin was in position to be a Constitutional Entrepreneur in the national electoral
reform effort, but his party’s subsequent electoral setbacks forced the Liberals to reprioritize their governing
initiatives. There was no ideational change among Canada’s governing parties; the Liberals put electoral reform
on the backburner in order to attempt to hold on to power, and the Conservatives were never interested in
reform to begin with.
Success of Reform Effort
As of this writing, no vote has ever been held on the recommendations of the Law Commission’s report.
LeDuc (2009, 21-2) blames the failure of the Commission’s report to gain traction in part on “institutional
inertia,” claiming that while SMP would not be the first choice of Canadians if they could start from scratch, “it
is quite a different matter to reform an institution that has been in place for 140 years…” Prominent politicians
attempted to keep reform alive after the setbacks (and eventual fall) of the Martin government. Jack Layton, the
late NDP leader, tried using reform as leverage in exchange for supporting a minority government (CTV News
Staff 2004). Despite such attempts, the Harper government dissolved the Law Commission in 2006, effectively
killing the reform process at the national level. The electoral reform effort at the national level must be
classified as a failure. But in spite of this failure, attempts at electoral reform have lived on in Canada’s
provincial governments.
Provincial Reform
From 2003-2009, five Canadian provinces had “undertaken studies to see whether reform of the electoral
system might help alleviate Canada’s ‘democratic deficit’” (Barnes and Robertson 2009, 1). Three of the five
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provinces held a vote on changing the electoral system, but all five went as far as to issue an official
government report which recommended electoral system reform. All five provinces therefore meet the
threshold for viable electoral reform efforts. For each reform effort, I’ve determined the primary actor
involved, identified the presence or absence of a constitutional entrepreneur and an ideational change in the
governing parties, and discussed whether the reform effort was a success or a failure.
British Columbia
Much has been written about the electoral reform effort in British Columbia, though the primary focus
of research has been the unique democratic experiment of the BC Citizens’ Assembly 4. However, the reform
effort predates the formation of the Assembly; its origins can be traced to the results of the 1996 general
election. In this election, the NDP won 39 of the 79 seats in BC Legislative Assembly with only 39% of the
vote. The Liberal party won only 33 seats, with 42% of the popular vote. NDP was able to form a government
despite having a smaller popular vote share than its opposition, prompting the Liberal party to make electoral
reform a key part of their platform for the 2001 general election (Reynolds et al. 2005, 17-18).
Liberals won the 2001 election in a landslide; with 58% of the popular vote, the Liberal party was able
to secure all but two seats in the Legislative Assembly (ibid). The exaggerated majority won by the Liberals
was important for two reasons. First, it swept into office a political party that had made electoral reform a key
part of its platform. Second, it represented a second consecutive anomalous electoral outcome (an exaggerated
majority following an “upside down” electoral result), giving the citizens of BC a clear reason to desire
electoral reform just as a party with a pro-reform agenda was coming to power. The marriage of interests
between citizens and politicians ought to have made electoral reform inevitable (Carty et al. 2008, 141).
Liberal Premier Gordon Campbell had campaigned on the idea of forming a Citizens’ Assembly to
address the BC electoral system. Once in power, Campbell called for the formation of an Assembly with the
mandate to “assess all possible models for electing MLAs, including preferential ballots, proportional
representation, and our current electoral system” (Wilson 2009, ii). Electoral system reform was discussed as
part of a larger package of reforms, including the adoption of more transparent accounting practices and the

4

See Lang 2007; Lundberg 2007; and Ward 2008.
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establishment of fixed election dates (Carty et al. 2008, 142). Campbell made no reference to the anomalous
outcomes of the previous two elections, but did speak more broadly about a malaise among the BC electorate
and a declining level of trust in the government. Joy McPhail, the leader of the opposition NDP, concurred that
reform was necessary, citing a recent study that showed BC voters were dissatisfied with the current electoral
system (ibid). The leader of the BC Green party also favored a reform, circulating a petition in 2002 for a bill
that would replace SMP with a mixed electoral system (Massicotte 2005, 113).
To review the electoral system and suggest and alternative, the government formed a Citizens’
Assembly, a first-of-its-kind democratic institution. Two aspects of the Assembly were unique: the people
appointed to it were not experts, but randomly selected from the electorate; and whatever electoral system the
Assembly decided on would be put to a voters in a binding referendum (Reynolds et al. 2005, 17-8). The
Assembly was formed in 2004 by randomly selecting one man and one woman from each riding (from among
those registered voters who had opted into the selection process, excluding sitting politicians and their staff).
One man and one woman from the province’s aboriginal community were also selected at random to represent
the aboriginal community at large. The result was a nonpartisan body of 160 citizens. The lists from which
members were randomly selected had been engineered to produce a representative sample of age, gender, and
geographic location (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 1). The work of the Assembly was divided into three phases:
a learning phase, a public hearing phase, and a deliberation and decision phase.
The first phase of the Assembly took place in six weekend-long sessions from January to March 2004
(Wilson 2009, 4). The members were assigned David Farrell’s Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction
(1st Edition: 2001). Through assigned readings, discussions, and lectures from various experts, the Assembly
learned the benefits, drawbacks, and logistics of numerous types of electoral systems. At the end of the learning
phase, the Assembly published a report summarizing their findings to date, titled “A Preliminary Report to the
People of British Columbia.” They made this report available to libraries, universities, and local governments.
From May to June 2004, the Assembly conducted 50 public hearings on electoral system reform. The
locations of these hearings were choses such that every member of the BC electorate would live within a 90
minute drive of at least one hearing (Wilson 2009, 5). The purpose of the hearings was to learn what citizens
were looking for in a new electoral system, and to hear proposals for reform. Citizens who could not attend a
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hearing were encouraged to submit a proposal online or by mail. All told, the Assembly received 383
presentations and 1603 written proposals, which members of the Assembly were given the summer to review
(ibid).
The Assembly reconvened in September for the third phase. Their only direction from the government
was to design an electoral system that would be compatible with both the Canadian constitution and the
Westminster parliamentary system (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 2). Through deliberation, the Assembly
developed three additional criteria to consider: fair election results through proportionality, effective local
representation, and greater voter choice (Wilson 2009, 5). The criteria from the government were broad, and
would allow the Assembly to consider nearly any electoral system. But the self-adopted criteria of the
Assembly were more restrictive. Proportionality and Effective Local Representation are two dimensions of
electoral systems that often exist in tension with each other. That tension effectively limited the Assembly to
the consideration of two systems: STV and MMP. On October 24, the Assembly voted 146-7 to endorse STV
for British Columbia (Reynolds et al. 2005, 18).
Primary Actor
The reform effort in BC may have begun as a political strategy on the part of BC Liberals, but the
reform process was entirely dominated by citizens. The Citizens’ Assembly was empowered with a broad
mandate for reform, which was not narrowly tailored to produce a pre-determined outcome (see New
Brunswick). The Assembly’s mandate allowed for the consideration of any electoral system, and explicitly
permitted the Assembly to choose the status quo over reform if it desired. Whatever system the Assembly
endorsed would be voted on directly by the people in the binding referendum, bypassing the input of politicians
altogether (although anti-reform politicians were still able to constrain the process in a limited way; see below).
With 77 of the 79 seats in the Legislative Assembly, the Liberal party was in a position to impose any
electoral reform it wanted. The fact that it didn’t may have been a rare example of politicians conceding control
of the political process in the name of serving the public good (Carty et al. 2008, 160). It may also have been an
example of politicians being constrained by the fear of public backlash, and thus behaving in a way designed to
garner public support, what Shugart calls “act-contingent behavior” (Shugart 2008, 16). Either way, the

40
absence of politician-dominant behavior in context where one party dominates the government suggests that this
reform process was very much a citizen-dominated one.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
Flinders (2010, 53) addresses the presence of a Constitutional Entrepreneur and the absence of
Ideational Change in the BC case rather thoroughly. Gordon Campbell was a strong advocate for reform,
proposing the idea of the Citizens’ Assembly as early as 1999 and seeing that promise thorough to fruition once
elected into the majority. As Premier of British Columbia, Campbell was in a position to guide the reform
effort through its various veto points. However, the Liberal party was not a homogeneous entity on the issue of
reform. As Flinders notes, “…many within his party were less committed to supporting a measure that would
likely dilute their power…” (ibid). While this meant MLAs were willing to adopt the act-contingent position of
supporting the Citizens’ Assembly, behind the scenes they were bargaining with Campbell to restrain the reform
process. The result of these behind-the-scenes negotiations was the “double-threshold” which ultimately killed
the reform (see below). But the mere existence of such deal-making suggests that Campbell’s fervor for reform
was not symptomatic of a larger ideational change in the governing parties.
Success of Reform Effort
The binding referendum on adopting BC-STV was scheduled to appear on the 2005 general election
ballot. The Liberal party took no official position on BC-STV, although some individual members campaigned
in support or opposition to it. Instead, Liberals largely endorsed the process itself. NDP followed the Liberal
lead; the party was rebuilding, with only one incumbent running for reelection, and the caucus was divided in
their support of reform. NDP members saw the Liberal silence on STV as an opportunity not to have to commit
to political position of unknown popularity (Carty et al. 2008, 158-9). The BC Green party, which had captured
12% of the popular vote in the last election, made it their official position to support any reform that would lead
to more proportionality. The leader of the Greens preferred MMP, and initially came out against the BC-STV
referendum, but the party caucus forced her to recant those statements (ibid).
Internally, the Liberal party caucus was divided on the prospect of electoral reform. The initial
proposal for the Citizens’ Assembly, submitted by former MLA Gordon Gibson, had made no mention of
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requiring any special threshold on the binding referendum. In fact, Gibson argued that the constitution did not
even require a referendum be held in order to implement the Assembly’s decision (Gibson 2002, 28). But as
noted above, Campbell needed to appease the reticent members of his caucus in order to see the Assembly’s
reform proposal reach the voters. As noted in a working paper by Campbell Sharman (quoted in Flinders 2010,
52), Gordon Campbell could only gain the support of his party if the Citizens’ Assembly were “hedged about
with procedural limits which had a good chance of guaranteeing rejection.” These “procedural limits” took the
form of a double-threshold for success on the BC-STV referendum: 60% of the popular vote, and a simple
majority in 60% of the ridings.
Support for BC-STV was large, but insufficient. The 2005 referendum produced a Yes vote (in favor
of STV) of 57.69% province-wide, and majority support in 77 of 79 ridings. The second threshold (designed to
keep the large urban centers of Victoria and Vancouver from dominating the vote) was easily cleared, but the
first threshold proved to be too high. Despite failing to pass, the substantial support BC-STV did receive was
sufficient to convince Premier Campbell to hold a second referendum. Initially, the referendum was proposed
for the 2008 municipal elections, but the Chief Electoral Officer did not feel that deadline provided enough
time. The second referendum was rescheduled for the 2009 general election. The double-threshold was again
required for passage, but proved unnecessary. The referendum failed with only 39% of the popular vote and a
majority in just 7 of the (now) 85 ridings (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 3). With the dramatic drop-off in support
for electoral reform, the reform effort in BC is effectively dead.
Prince Edward Island
Prince Edward Island (PEI) is a small, homogeneous province with a political culture “marked by
strong partisanship and party loyalty, and close relationships between representatives and their constituents”
(Cousins 2000). However, starting in 1989, a trend began to emerge in PEI elections—wild swings in the
popular vote from party to party, disproportionately small opposition parties, and a vibrant third party that
exposed the weaknesses in the SMP electoral system.
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Table 3: General Election Results, PEI 1978-2003
Source: Chief Electoral Officer Reports
(http://www.electionspei.ca/provincial/historical/ceoreports/index.php)
Year5

PC Vote %

PC Seats

Lib Vote

Lib Seats

%

NDP Vote

NDP Seats

Gallagher
Index6

%

1978

48.2

15

50.7

17

1.1

0

2.16

1979

53.2

21

45.3

11

1.3

0

11.74

1982

53.6

21

45.7

11

0.7

0

11.67

1986

45.6

11

50.4

21

4.0

0

13.65

1989

35.8

2

60.7

30

3.5

0

31.45

1993

39.5

1

55.1

31

5.4

0

39.38

1996

47.4

18

44.8

8

7.8

1

17.61

2000

57.9

26

33.7

1

8.4

0

34.97

2003

54.0

23

42.9

4

3.1

0

29.76

The trend in increasing disproportionality is due mostly to the introduction of a competitive third party. Note
that the only major aberration in the trend comes when the NDP finally broke through and won a seat in 1996.
In the five elections from 1989-2003, the opposition party won four or fewer seats four times, and in two of
those elections the opposition could only manage to win a single seat. It is no wonder then that in 2003, PEI
Premier Pat Binns called for a “complete, independent and accountable examination of Prince Edward Island’s
electoral system” whose “focus would be on consulting with Islanders” and whose purpose would be to ensure
that “the manner in which our Legislative Assembly is selected continues to be relevant and effective” (Binns
2003).

5

PEI elected 32 MLAs in 16 dual-member ridings until 1996. From the 1996 election on, PEI elected 27 MLAs
from single-member constituencies.
6
The Gallagher Index (or Least Squares Index) measures the disproportionality of an electoral outcome, on a
scale of 0-100. A higher score indicates a more disproportional outcome.
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Binns announced the formation of a “Commission on Prince Edward Island’s Electoral Future” in his
November, 2002 Throne Speech (Wilson 2009, 21). The following January, he appointed former provincial
Chief Justice Norman Carruthers as the sole member of the Commission, and directed him to study the issue of
electoral reform in an inclusive manner, soliciting input from Islanders and educating the public on the various
options (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 7). The Commission produced a report examining four potential models of
reform in April, and held series of public meetings in May and June to hear feedback from voters. During those
two months, Carruthers also travelled the province speaking at schools and service organizations, raising
awareness of the need for electoral reform while simultaneously soliciting input from the electorate (Wilson
2009, 22).
The Commission’s final report, released in December 2003, recommended abandoning SMP in favor
of either MMP or STV (Carruthers 2003, 98). The report cited several organizations whose input lead to the
Commission’s recommendation. The Canadian Union of Public Employees had endorsed proportional
representation, as did the Prince Edward Island Federation of Labour. The PEI Federation of Agriculture
wanted assurances that regional and rural representation would persist in a new electoral system. The
Commission felt either MMP or STV would provide the optimum balance between these requests, and would
also “respond better to the expectations and demands of today’s electorate…[and] provide effective
representation for the electorate…” (ibid, 98-9). Of the two systems, Carruthers felt MMP would be the better
choice for PEI, because it would be less of a change for voters and therefore an easier sell (Wilson 2009, 22).
The Commission, however, did not propose implementing MMP without further consultation with the
people. Instead, Carruthers proposed forming a “commission comprised of representatives from all political
parties and the general public” (Carruthers 2009, 100). The Legislative Assembly did exactly that a year later,
in December 2004. They appointed an eight-member Commission on Prince Edward Island’s Electoral Future,
made up of a chair person, one member from each official party (Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, and
NDP), and one citizen from each of the four federal ridings. The new Commission first met in March 2005,
with the mandate to design an MMP that would work for PEI, lead a public education campaign on the
differences between SMP and MMP, and develop a clear plebiscite question to put to the voters (Barnes and
Roberson 2009, 8-9). The Commission issued a report in May proposing the specifics of an MMP system in
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PEI, and held a dozen public meetings in September and October to discuss the system with voters (ibid). A
plebiscite was held on November 28, in which the voters of PEI were asked whether they would support
changing the electoral system to MMP. The plebiscite would become binding only if it met a double-threshold
of 60% support and majority support in 60% of the provincial constituencies (Wilson 2009, 23-4).
Primary Actor
Like the reform effort at the national level, the reform effort in PEI was an attempt to placate an
increasingly dissatisfied electorate and mend an institution that was starting to show its cracks. The process was
initiated at the elite level, but at all times the reform effort was constrained by a desire not to upset the public.
The reform effort in PEI is best characterized as Mass Constraint, in which “politicians want to impose reforms
but are constrained from doing so by fear of upsetting the public” (Renwick 2011, 457). Carruthers’ report is
adamant that electoral reform is necessary, but he is equally adamant that the public be educated further on the
subject before being asked to vote on it. Carruthers may have sensed in his travels that the PEI electorate would
be collectively resistant to the changes he felt were necessary, which is why he pushed so hard for further study,
further education, and the legitimacy of a public referendum. The reform process was an elite dominated
process, constrained (and ultimately stymied) by the masses.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
The electoral reform effort in PEI consisted of “three separate processes, with each successive step
seeking a wider range of input” (Wilson 2009, 21). Premier Binns pushed for reform at each stage, and with the
large PC majority in the Legislative Assembly, he was in a strong position to do so.
A simple glance at the vote totals for the motion to form the Commission on PEI’s Electoral Future
would suggest that electoral reform was a partisan effort, and not an example of ideational change among the
governing parties. But the 23-4, party line vote fails to tell the whole story. Transcripts of the debate in the
Legislative Assembly suggest all members were in favor of pursuing electoral reform. The Leader of the
Opposition rose in partial support of the motion, stating “…I agree with the minister of education that the intent
of this motion is absolutely correct. We should have a referendum or a plebiscite on proportional
representation” (Motion 32 2004, 1097). According to the transcript, the opposition ultimately voted against the
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motion not because they were opposed to electoral reform, but because they felt the motion failed to establish
an adequate timeline for the Commission to act, and because they felt the NDP did not get adequate input into
the process (ibid, 1115).
With the support of Premier Binns and the collective support of the Legislative Assembly, the PEI
reform effort can be classified as possessing both a Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change among
the governing parties.
Success of the Reform Effort
Elite support for electoral reform pushed it as far as a plebiscite to the people, but no farther. On
November 28, 2005, the citizens of PEI soundly rejected the proposed change to MMP, with only 36% of voters
supporting reform, and only two of 27 constituencies supplying majority support (Wilson 2009, 24).
Proponents of MMP blame the landslide loss on a lack of public education and public awareness, which in turn
lead to a lack of turnout (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 9). Indeed, voter turnout for the plebiscite was only
33.2% (Elections PEI). This constitutes a significant drop off from the 83.27% turnout in the general election
two years prior, as well as the 64.95% turnout in the most recent plebiscite (a 1988 vote on establishing a fixedlink crossing between PEI and New Brunswick). The electoral reform effort not only failed to pass, it failed to
interest the electorate.
New Brunswick
In 2003, the provincial government of New Brunswick established the Commission on Legislative
Democracy with the mandate to “examine and make recommendations on strengthening and modernizing [the]
electoral system…to make [it] more fair, open, accountable, and accessible…” (Barnes and Robertson 2009, 3).
The Commission proposed adopting PR, and was then tasked with designing a system that would balance
proportionality with the direct election of MLAs representing a geographic constituency. It was also asked to
consider new rules governing redistricting, the implementation of fixed election dates, and ways to increase
voter turnout (ibid).
The Commission held public hearings and meetings with community leaders, and launched a website
to inform voters of various proposals and allow them to respond. In January 2005, the Commission released its
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final report, recommending a version of MMP based on the Scottish and Welsh systems. The various
solicitations of public input did nothing to prevent the final report from recommending a system containing
every element requested by the government.
Primary Actor
The Progressive Conservative (PC) party commissioned the study of electoral reform six months after
a general election in which their majority in the Legislative Assembly shrunk from a 34 seat margin to just two
seats. This sudden loss of support, combined with a recent history of being the “victim” of the manufactured
majorities of the SMP system, made electoral reform a strategically attractive option to PC party MLAs looking
to retain power.
Table 4: Results of New Brunswick Legislative Assembly Elections, 1987-2003
Source: Elections New Brunswick (http://www.gnb.ca/elections/index-e.asp)
Year

Party

# Seats Won

% Seats Won*

% Popular

Difference

Vote
1987

1991

1995

1999

2003

Liberal

58

100

60.9

+39.61

PC

0

0

28.59

-28.59

Liberal

46

79.31

47.11

+32.2

PC

3

5.17

20.7

-15.53

Liberal

48

87.27

51.63

+35.64

PC

6

10.9

30.87

-19.97

Liberal

10

18.18

37.3

-19.12

PC

44

80

53

+27

Liberal

26

47.27

44.4

+2.87

PC

28

50.9

45.4

+5.5

*There were 58 seats in the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly in 1987 and 1991. The seat total was
reduced to 55 from 1995 on. Third party seat totals are not included in the above table.
As Table 4 demonstrates, the Progressive Conservative party was on the losing end of the distortive
effects of several SMP elections. The most egregious case was 1987, in which the Liberal party won every seat
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despite PC registering 28.59% of the popular vote province-wide. It was in the strategic interest of PC to put
into place a new electoral system that would prevent such distortions from occurring again.
The recommendations of the Commission on Legislative Democracy are difficult to classify on
Renwick’s scale of citizen-politician domination. The Commission did solicit public opinion in several
different ways before reaching its conclusion, suggesting a type of mass-elite interaction along the lines of the
“Passive Mass Impetus” reform effort at the national level. But the timing of the Commission’s formation, its
initial recommendation, and its eventual fate (see below) suggest a process that was more politician-dominated.
The Commission was established with a mandate and with specific terms of reference that were designed to
preordain the outcome. As Milner (2004, 20) observes, “…the terms of reference effectively invite the
commission to endorse the MMP model.” I would classify the New Brunswick reform effort as Mass
Constraint: a politician-dominated reform effort in which “politicians want to impose reforms but are
constrained from doing so by fear of upsetting public opinion” (Renwick 2011, 457). The reform effort did not
emerge during a time of distorted electoral outcomes (1987, 1999), but at a time when the electoral outcome
was the closest to “fair” that it had been in 15 years. The solicitation of public input and the recommendation to
put the system to a vote via referendum represent an acknowledgement by the PC that forcing electoral reforms
on New Brunswickers would not be acceptable. The New Brunswick reform effort was, at its heart, an elitedriven reform effort operating under the constraints of public opinion.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
Bernard Lord became the Premier of New Brunswick after his Progressive Conservatives swept into
power in 1999. The core of Lord’s campaign had been the “200 Days of Change” platform, which promised 20
major changes in the first 200 days of his premiership (Lord 1999). His platform included “changing the way
government works” to make it more open, responsive, and accountable (ibid). This was the impetus behind the
formation of the Commission on Legislative Democracy, and the principles of the 200 Days of Change are
evident the Lord government’s instructions to the Commission regarding proportionality, increased voter
turnout, and other reforms.
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Lord was the very definition of a Constitutional Entrepreneur, as he was “strategically located…at the
forefront of the political system acting as a driving force” for electoral reform (Flinders 2010, 53). But his
efforts at reform were a rational-strategic response to the current electoral system’s propensity to punish his
party with exaggerated majorities. The New Brunswick reform effort did not signal an Ideational Change in the
governing parties.
Success of Reform Effort
The Progressive Conservatives under Lord issued an official response to the Commission’s
recommendations in June 2006. The government report, entitled Improving the Way Government Works,
pledged to pursue 17 specific initiatives, including holding a referendum on May 12, 2008 to allow New
Brunswickers to accept or reject MMP for provincial elections (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 5). However, an
unrelated set of political events served to derail the reform effort before the referendum could be held. The PC
government held only a one-seat advantage over the opposition Liberals. When MLA Peter Mesheau (a
Progressive Conservative) announced his resignation to work in the private sector, Lord decided to call for a full
election rather than risk losing his slim majority in the by-election to fill Mesheau’s seat. Lord’s gambit
backfired; the Liberal party won 29 seats to the PC’s 26, despite the Conservatives narrowly edging the Liberals
in popular vote.
The new Liberal Premier, Shawn Graham, cancelled the proposed MMP referendum in June 2007
(Wilson 2009, 20). At the same time, the new government issued a new official response to the
recommendations of the Commission, which committed New Brunswick to a number of new initiatives to
“improve and enhance legislative democracy…” (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 5). The Liberal Graham
government did not endorse adopting MMP, stating that “the case for changing our electoral system to include
elements of proportional representation has not yet been made” (Wilson 2009, 20). The Commission of
Legislative Democracy has since been dissolved. New Brunswick’s electoral reform effort is a failed one.
Quebec
Quebec has a long history of considering electoral reform. Several legislative attempts at electoral
reform were proposed but later abandoned in the 1960s and 1970s (Wilson 2009, 12). René Lévesque, the
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founder of the Parti Québécois (PQ) and Premier of Quebec from 1976-1985, held public hearings in 1984 on
the question of electoral reform. He proposed a PR system for the province, but was unable to gain sufficient
support among his own party to pass the reform. A recent drop in the polls for PQ had allowed the Liberal
opposition (PLQ) to paint Lévesque’s reform effort as a power grab, effectively killing electoral reform in
Quebec for the next 14 years (Milner 2004, 24).
Calls for electoral reform were renewed in 1998 when PQ won a majority in the National Assembly of
Quebec (NA) despite winning only 42.9% of the vote (Wilson 2009, 12). PLQ sat in official opposition despite
winning 43.5% of the popular vote. A third party, Action democratique de Quebec (ADQ), won a single seat,
despite garnering 11.8% of the popular vote. These disproportional results prompted the formation of an
interest group called le Mouvement pour une démocratie nouvell (MDN) to pursue democratic reforms. In
2001, MDN presented the NA with a petition, signed by 125 prominent citizens, calling for reforms. Among
the signatories were former high-ranking members of PQ, PLQ, and ADQ (Milner 2004, 24).
In January 2002, partly in response to the MDN petition, Premier Bernard Landry appointed NA
Speaker Jean-Pierre Charbonneau to the Cabinet, placing him in charge of reforming Quebec’s democratic
institutions. Charbonneau then appointed André Larocque, one of the key players in Lévesque’s reform efforts,
to be his deputy (Milner 2004, 24). Charbonneau appointed an Estates General on the Reform of Democratic
Institutions (the Béland Commission), which held a 900-member deliberation in February 2003 before
presenting its recommendations to Charbonneau in March (ibid; Barnes and Robertson 2009, 10).
The Béland Commission recommended holding a referendum in which voters could choose between
SMP and a version of open-list PR similar to that used in Switzerland and Luxembourg (Wilson 2009, 13).
Two days after receiving the Commission’s recommendation, Premier Landry called for provincial elections;
PQ was soundly defeated by PLQ. The new Premier, PLQ leader Jean Charest, pledged his support to
democratic reforms, but ignored the recommendations of the Béland Commission. Instead, he appointed a
Minister Responsible for the Reform of Democratic Institutions, Jacque Dupuis (ibid).
In June 2004, Dupuis submitted 140 reform proposals to the NA. Among these proposals was a new
electoral system, which would resemble MMP in its combination of constituency and compensatory party seats.
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Seventy-seven seats would be chosen by SMP, and 50 by the d’Hondt method of PR. However, voters would
only cast one vote, which would count as both a constituency and a party vote. The party seats would not be
allocated according to party lists, but according to the “best losers,” those constituency candidates who had the
highest percentage of the vote in a losing effort (Barnes and Robertson 2009, 11). This electoral system was
based on a working paper by University of Montreal political scientist Louis Massicotte, who had been
mandated to design a new electoral system for the province (Wilson 2009, 14). Dupuis’s proposals were rolled
into a draft bill, which was introduced to the NA in December 2004.
Dupuis’s recommendations were not popular with the MDN. They mobilized their members to lobby
the NA to adopt the New Zealand version of MMP instead of Dupuis’s proposal. The MDN wanted a two-vote
ballot, and they wanted the party seats to be selected from party lists using the entire province as a single
constituency (Milner 2004, 26). In response to the MDN’s lobbying efforts, the NA appointed a Select
Committee on the Elections Act in June 2005 to study the Dupuis bill and recommend changes. The committee
was comprised of nine MNAs, and assisted by a Citizen’s Committee of eight private citizens. The committees
began their work in November 2005, and solicited public input in a series of meetings across Quebec beginning
in January 2006 (Barnes and Roberson 2009, 11). In April, six of the eight members of the Citizen’s
Committee issued their recommendation to the NA, proposing a German-style MMP system with a two-vote
ballot. Their report criticized the one-vote MMP proposal, arguing it would not “accurately reflect the popular
vote and…would perpetuate the practice of strategic voting” (ibid). The Select Committee could not agree on a
set of recommendations to submit to the NA.
With two conflicting proposals for reform before it, the government called upon the Chief Electoral
Officer (CEO) to study what differences, if any, would result from adopting one proposal over the other. The
CEO announced his findings in December 2007. While he refused to endorse a system, his conclusions suggest
that the two-vote MMP system proposed by the Citizen’s Committee would result in more proportional
outcomes and greater access for small parties than the system proposed by Minister Dupuis (Wilson 2009, 16).
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Primary Actor
The reform effort in Quebec can be characterized as an elite-mass interaction in which politicians have
been forced to pursue reform, and to amend their reform proposals, under the pressure of mobilized citizens.
Renwick calls this Active Mass Impetus (2011, 457). The initial “upside down” election results in 1998
prompted the formation of the MDN, which calls itself a “non-partisan citizens’ movement dedicated to
promoting a reform of the Quebec voting system” (MDN English Homepage). It was the pressure of the MDN
which pushed Landry’s PQ government to pursue reform. After the PQ government was replaced by a PLQ
government which sought to pursue less proportional electoral reforms, the MDN again mobilized.
The MDN are just one example of how citizens dominated the reform effort. In response to MDN
pressure, the NA established both a politician-dominated Select Committee and a citizen-dominated Citizen’s
Committee to consider Dupuis’s reform proposals. While the Select Committee was deadlocked, the Citizen’s
Committee was able to recommend a comprehensive set of reforms, and enunciate a clear critique of the Dupuis
plan. Rather than deliberate on the Dupuis plan, the NA was forced to subject the Dupuis plan and the Citizen’s
Committee plan to a comparative study. That study appeared to favor the Committee’s plan, despite claiming to
be disinterested. Citizens, and not politicians, were in control of the reform process.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
The reform process in Quebec was not guided by a Constitutional Entrepreneur, in part because of the
change of government partway through. It was the MDN that pushed for reform early on, but their best allies in
positions of elite power were Minister Charbonneau and Deputy Minister Larocque, neither of whom was
sufficiently powerful to navigate the various veto-points of reform. They were able to establish the Béland
commission, but their influence ended with the 2003 election. The PLQ government pledged their support to
reform, but Premier Charest expended no political capital in pushing a reform effort through the NA. Minister
Dupuis did submit a number of reforms to the NA, but he held insufficient sway over the body to guide his
reform proposals through to passage.
While there was no clear hand guiding the reform effort from a position of institutional power, there
was evidence of ideational change among the governing parties. The specific reforms proposed by PQ did not
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survive the change in government, but the pursuit of electoral reform more generally did survive the transition.
All three parties recognized the need for reform of some kind. Unlike Lévesque’s aborted reform effort in the
1980s, in which neither his own party nor the opposition supported reform, the reform efforts of 2001-2008
represent a multi-party consensus on reform in general, with disagreement surrounding the particulars. This
represents a political cultural shift away from the majoritarian way of thinking, towards a more consensual
political culture.
Success of Reform Effort
In January 2008, less than a month after the CEO released his findings, the PLQ government
abandoned its attempts at electoral reform. The last election had reduced the PLQ to minority government
status; party leaders were therefore reticent to risk their popularity on a potentially unpopular electoral reform
(LeDuc 2009, 25). Minister Benoit Pelletier announced the end of the reform effort, stating that "In two
provinces (Ontario and British Columbia), the population has rejected proposals to reform the voting
system. We are obliged to take note of the plebiscite…” 7 (La Presse 2008). Pelletier went on to say that he
would not rule out holding a referendum on the issue of electoral reform, if all three parties would agree.
“While there may be a social consensus on a reform of the voting - and again, it is difficult to measure the
degree of consensus - it is nonetheless true that people do not agree on modalities. Regional compensations,
national compensations, one vote, two votes, three votes, opinions are extremely varied” 8 (ibid). At this point,
the reform effort in Quebec cannot be categorized a success.
Ontario
Electoral reform in Ontario began as a plank of the Liberal party platform, which sat in opposition
throughout the decade of the 1990s. The NDP sat in government from 1990-1995, despite winning just 38% of
the popular vote. The Progressive-Conservative party followed NDP as the majority party from 1995-2003,

7

Translated by Google. Original Text: “Dans deux provinces (Ontario et Colombie-Britannique), la population
a rejeté des propositions en matière de réforme du mode de scrutin. On est obligé de prendre acte de ce
plebiscite…”
8
Original text: “S’il peut y avoir un certain consensus social sur une réforme du mode de scrutin - et encore là,
il est difficile de mesurer l’ampleur du consensus -, il n’en reste pas moins que les gens ne s’entendent pas sur
les modalités. Compensations régionales, nationales, un vote, deux votes, trois votes, les opinions sont
extrêmement varies.”
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despite winning only 45% of the vote. The PC government used its majority to institute major changes to
government health services, education, and municipal government, despite objections from the Liberals that the
PC had no clear mandate to do so (LeDuc 2009, 26). It is no surprise that the Liberal party saw a strategic
interest in electoral reform.
The 2003 election saw the Ontario Liberals swept into the majority with just 46% of the popular vote.
The Liberal campaign included a pledge to institute sweeping reforms to the electoral process, but after winning
a majority of seats in the Provincial Parliament with a bare plurality of the popular vote, the Liberals were slow
to enact their promised reforms. In November 2004, Premier McGuinty announced his intent to form a
Citizens’ Assembly to study electoral system reform, modeled after the process in British Columbia. The
Provincial Parliament didn’t authorize the formation of the Assembly until June 2005, and the selection process
for Assembly members didn’t begin until April 2006 (Barnes and Robertson 2009, 6-7).
The Ontario Citizens’ Assembly was modeled closely after the BC Assembly. The process was
coordinated by Elections Ontario, which chose 103 people at random from the voter rolls (one from each
constituency in the province). The mandate for the Assembly required the selection of 52 women, 51 men, and
at least one Aboriginal person of either sex (Wilson 2009, 9). The Assembly convened in September 2006 with
a learning phase of six weekend sessions. During its consultation phase, it held 41 public meetings and received
1537 written submissions via mail and the internet. After individually reviewing these proposals, the Assembly
reconvened in February 2007 for its deliberation phase, where it developed three criteria for selecting an
electoral system for Ontario: Voter Choice, Fair Election Results (proportionality), and Strong Local
Representation (ibid, 10). As in the case of BC, these criteria guided the Assembly to a debate between STV
and MMP. In this case, the Assembly settled on MMP.
Primary Actor
As in British Columbia, citizens dominated much of the reform process: the Citizens’ Assembly had a
broad mandate to act autonomously from the Provincial Parliament, and its recommendations were submitted
directly to Ontarians in a binding referendum, bypassing any legislative or executive influence. But unlike BC,
where elite resistance to BC-STV was more covert, politicians in Ontario took a more active role in trying to
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thwart the reform efforts of the Citizens’ Assembly. The Liberal party took no official position on MMP, but
NDP officially endorsed it and PC opposed it, making it a partisan issue. While Liberals were outwardly
disinterested, within the caucus there was much disagreement. As in the BC case, the Ontario government set a
high double-threshold for acceptance of the MMP referendum, a move that some speculated was intended to
make passage impossible (LeDuc 2009, Footnote 15). The government also severely underfunded the education
effort, and refused to provide funding to the pro and con campaigns. This left the education of Ontarians
largely up to interest groups, and to the media, who were largely opposed to reform (ibid, 31). The government
even refused to make the final report of the Citizens’ Assembly freely available to the public, classifying it as a
“pro-reform” document and therefore a violation of Elections Ontario’s neutrality mandate. This lack of a
serious education campaign was a crucial factor in determining the outcome of the referendum; at the time the
Citizens’ Assembly made its recommendation, 81% of Ontarians reported having seen or heard “little or
nothing” of the Assembly’s recommendation (ibid). With public awareness of the MMP proposal so low, and
government support for public education on the issue so lacking, the “No” vote had an inherent advantage going
into the referendum.
Citizens dominated part of the reform process, but the decision-making stage of the process was
overwhelmed by interests and machinations of politicians, and it was these interests that ultimately decided the
fate of reform. The reform process was an elite-mass interaction in which politicians were ultimately the
dominant actors.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
While Premier McGuinty instigated a campaign for electoral reform during his party’s 13 years in the
wilderness, his zeal for reform seemed to wane in the wake of electoral victory. He adopted other reforms to
the electoral process, including fixed election dates and restrictions on campaign finance, but on the question of
electoral system reform, he “rather ostentatiously announced his ‘neutrality’ on the issue” (LeDuc 2009, 26).
There was no active proponent of reform who occupied a sufficiently powerful place in government to help
navigate the reform effort through its various veto points. Neither was there a major ideational change in the
political culture of the governing parties. The reform effort had begun as a Liberal strategic response to being
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out of power for over a decade. Reform was a partisan issue, support by the NDP and opposed by the PC. The
Liberal party itself was divided on the issue.
Success of Reform Effort
Given the lack of public education on MMP, opposition from the editorial boards of nearly every
major newspaper in Ontario, and the high double-threshold for success, the Ontario MMP referendum seemed
unlikely to succeed. The No MMP campaign was able to capitalize on low voter information to emphasize the
negatives of proportionality with a low (3%) threshold: divided governments, more fringe parties, and higher
party discipline (at the expense of constituency representation). The No MMP campaign also argued that
increasing the size of the Provincial Parliament, as the MMP proposal sought to do, would mean more
politicians in Queen’s Park trying to run the lives of Ontarians (Wilson 2009, 12). The Yes campaign, led by
Fair Vote Canada/Fair Vote Ontario, had difficulty overcoming the information barrier to sell the advantages of
MMP.
The referendum was held during the October 2007 general election. Voters were asked to choose
either the existing electoral system (First-Past-The-Post), or electoral system recommended by the Citizens’
Assembly (MMP). MMP received the support of only 36.9% of voters, and won a majority of only five of the
103 ridings. Unlike BC, the failure of the Ontario reform referendum was significant enough to kill the reform
effort for good, without a second referendum.
Summary
Listed below is a summary of the Canadian cases of attempted majoritarian modification. Every reform
effort, at the national and subnational level, has been a failure. While this is instructive as to what combinations
of values of the proposed explanatory variables correspond to a failed reform effort, these data are only useful
in developing an explanatory theory of electoral system reform when compared to a set of cases which resulted
in successful reform efforts. The following sections, on reform efforts in the UK and New Zealand, will
provide a combination of successful and failed cases that will be useful in comparison with Canada.
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Table 5: Summary of Case Studies -- Canada
Case

Con. Entre.

Idea. Change

Primary Actor

Level of Gov

Success

Canada Natl

Yes

No

Citizen

Natl

No

BC

Yes

No

Citizen

Sub

No

PEI

Yes

Yes

Politician

Sub

No

NB

Yes

No

Politician

Sub

No

Quebec

No

Yes

Politician

Sub

No

Ontario

No

No

Politician

Sub

No
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Case Studies: The United Kingdom
Until the 1970s, there was little call in the UK for changing the electoral system, outside of the wishes of
the Liberal Democratic Party (a perpetual also-ran in a Westminster system dominated by the Labour and
Conservative parties). But for a period after the landslide victory of the Labour party in the 1997 General
Election, the UK underwent a series of significant constitutional reforms, including electoral system reforms at
the subnational and supranational level, resulting in a broad diversification of electoral systems in the country
that once stood as the model of adherence to First Past the Post. Reforms included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Adoption of Single Transferable Vote (STV) in Northern Ireland
Proportional and Mixed-Member systems in the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly of Wales, and
the Greater London Authority
List PR for elections to the European Parliament (or, in the case of Northern Ireland, STV)
Instant Runoff Voting for London Mayoral elections
A Government-commissioned study proposing to reform elections to the House of Commons, which
eventually resulted in a failed national referendum.

As one scholar notes, the UK began the 20th century as a nation with “a diversified franchise and a
universal electoral system”, but closed the 20th century with “a diversified electoral system and a uniform
franchise” (Bogdanor 2005, 85-6).
National Reform: New Labour and the Jenkins Commission
Dunleavy and Margetts (2001, 299) note that UK general election results could be severely
disproportional at a national level, typically with the largest party in terms of votes receiving a strongly
exaggerated share of Commons seats, while third- or fourth-placed parties nationally accumulated significant
votes shares and won few or no seats. Across whole regions of the country it was common for the leading party
to win virtually all seats, creating ‘electoral deserts’ for its opponents, a trend that grew sharply worse after the
mid-1970s with increasing regionalization of alignments.
The origins of electoral system reform at the national level trace back to mid-1980s defeats for Labour.
One of the primary incubators for reform was Scotland, where, in 1987, the Conservative party was roundly
defeated for the ninth consecutive election despite winning its third consecutive general election UK-wide. This
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led to a broad-based movement for constitutional reform in Scotland. Labour and the Liberal Democrats joined
Scottish nationalists in calls for reform, because they had to be seen as being part of the solution to the problem
that Scotland was getting a government in Westminster that it didn’t vote for, for the fifth time in 30 years
(McLean 1999, 149). The two parties, joined by trade unions and churches, came together in 1995 to hold a
Scottish Constitutional Convention. The Convention was boycotted by the Conservative party, and elicited no
participation from the Scottish National Party (Dunleavy and Margetts 1999, 15).
The Scottish Constitutional Convention defined devolution proposals in Scotland. The SCC had to
devise a Liberal-Labour compromise on a new voting system that the SNP could live with too, to assuage
concerns that a devolved Scottish Parliament would be dominated by lowland Labour. Labour agreed to a more
proportional system, but refused to adopt Liberal Democrats’ STV recommendation for fear of a breakdown in
party discipline. (Dunleavey and Margetts 2001, 301) The result of negotiations at the SCC was the decision to
recommend adopting the Additional Member System, a Mixed-Member electoral system that would combine 73
single-member constituency seats with 56 List-PR representatives (McLean 1999, 149).
Negotiations in Scotland influenced Labour’s strategy in Wales as well. In previous negotiations,
Labour had held out for an SMP electoral system in proposals for Welsh devolution. However in the 1992-7
parliament, the shadow Welsh secretary convinced his fellow Welsh Parliamentary Labour Party members to
adopt a modified version of the Scottish proposal. Adopting a mixed member system would allow Labour
maintain dominance in Wales, but to appear to be more open to proportional representation. Fear that Wales
would be dominated by Welsh Labour Party elites (sometimes called a “taffia” or, pejoratively, the “crachach”)
had undermined the devolution movement in 1979; adopting a more proportional system was meant to allay that
fear and bring Plaid Cymru to the table (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001, 301).
Labour saw that the calls for devolution and electoral reform could help them build the coalition
necessary to take back control of the government. In March 1997, Labour MP Robin Cook and Liberal
Democrat MP Robert Maclennan co-chaired the Joint Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reforms. The
resulting “Cook-Maclennan Agreement” codified the devolution schemes for Scotland and Wales, presaged the
changes to the London Assembly, and included an agreement to introduce PR to the European elections. Six
weeks later, Labour won a strong majority in the House of Commons, with Liberal Democrats doubling their
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representation as well (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001, 301-302). The partnership between Labour and Liberal
Democrats was key to Labour winning back government; there is evidence of tactical voting in the 1997
election between Labour and Liberal Democratic voters, with those voters switching allegiance in
constituencies where the other party stood a better chance of topping the Conservative candidate. Labour won
in a landslide with the tactical support of Liberal Democratic voters, and the Lib Dems increased their share of
seats in Westminster from 22 to 46 with the tactical support of Labour voters (Dunleavy 2009, 625).
With Labour firmly in control of parliament, in Fall of 1997 Scottish and Welsh devolution was
ratified by two referenda, and Labour set up the Independent Commission on the Voting System (commonly
known as the Jenkins Commission, after its chairman Roy Jenkins), to recommend a new electoral system for
the House of Commons. The Commission’s charge was born from the Cook-Maclennan pack’s call to
implement a more proportional electoral system for elections to the House of Commons. In introducing the
Commission, Prime Minister Tony Blair called for the next century of British politics to be dominated by
“radical” forces instead of the Conservative government that dominated the 20 th century (Dunleavy and
Margetts 2001, 302-303)
The makeup of the Jenkins Commission gave it the appearance of being a representative body.
Academics and lobbyists were excluded from the process—the Commission was made up of three party figures,
one civil servant, and one journalist. The three party figures represented a spectrum of political views in the
UK (Jenkins himself was a former Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer and, later, a Liberal Democratic leader
in the House of Lords, while the other two members were a Conservative banker and a Labour national
organizer). The civil servant oversaw STV elections in Northern Ireland, and the journalist was a reporter for
The Economist who coverer UK elections (and was himself a former aide to a Labour MP) (McLean 1999,
152). The partisan-political makeup of the Jenkins Commission stands in stark contrast to New Zealand’s
government-appointed commission to consider electoral reform, which was constituted largely of non-partisan
experts (Lundberg 2007, 478).
The Commission was given 12 months to report back, with the instructions that it recommend an
electoral system for Parliamentary elections that “observe[s] the requirement for broad proportionality, the need
for stable government, an extension of voter choice and the maintenance of a link between MPs and
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geographical constituencies” (Dunleavy and Margetts 1999, 14). Those criteria, especially the competing
desires for “broad proportionality” and “stable government”, would seem to put the Commission in an
impossible position. As Flinders notes, the goal of the Commission was not to actually accomplish electoral
reform, but to provide “a form of executive pressure-valve that [would allow] the Labour government to claim
that electoral reform was being taken seriously…” (2010, 52). McLean is slightly more generous,
characterizing the Commission’s purpose as “[finding] something which satisfies reformers just enough to
count as barely acceptable to them, while comforting conservatives that it is the minimum you could offer”
(1999, 153).
Despite its constraints, the Commission did come forward with recommendations. Jenkins called for a
Mixed Member system to satisfy Labour’s desires for stable government and strong constituent-MP linkage, as
well as the Lib Dem desires for proportionality and expanded voter choice. The commission initially planned to
recommend a mixed member system for the House, with a 67:33 mix of SMP and PR representatives. Sensing
that Labour MPs would reject such a dramatic change, Blair intervened in a private meeting with Jenkins, and
pushed for a formula with a higher proportion of single-member seats (Mitchell 2005, 178). The Commission
returned with a less proportional proposal in 1998 (termed “AV+”, it would elect single-member district
representative with the AV preferential ballot, and offer a small “top-up” based on List-PR to help correct any
vote-seat disproportionality caused by those single-member districts) . The Jenkins Commission proposals were
strongly opposed by the Labour cabinet, by unions, and by “heartland” Labour party. In the face of party
opposition, Blair punted on the proposals, which hurt the Lib-Lab coalition in the near term, until the Lib Dems
decided to refocus their priorities on reforming local elections (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001, 303). At the same
time that Labour was sitting on the Jenkins recommendations, the government went forward with electoral
system reforms in the devolved Scottish and Welsh bodies, as well as in the newly created Greater London
Assembly (see below).
The Jenkins recommendations were thought to be dead, but Blair convinced Labour opponents of
reform in 2000 that the 2001 Labour platform should include a pledge to re-examine the issue in 2003. Blair
believed re-election of the Labour majority in 2001 would depend on another successfully Lib-Lab cooperation,
as it did in 1997 (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001, 304). However no referendum on the Jenkins Commission’s

61
recommendations would appear on the ballot during Labour’s 13 years in government. A referendum on
changing the electoral system for elections to the House of Commons would not appear on the ballot until 2011,
and when it did, it would be for changing the system to AV instead of the Jenkins recommendation of AV+
(Curtice 2013, 215).
Primary Actor
The preponderance of analysis would suggest that the reform effort codified in the Jenkins
Commission was an elite-driven process, born from the strategic machinations of the Labour and Liberal
Democratic parties after their decades in the minority government. It was the kind of “act-contingent behavior”
characterized by Shugart (2008, 16), whereby Labour could succeed in winning Liberal Democratic support by
appearing to be in favor of electoral reform at the national level. Labour was not “punished” by the electorate
in the next general election for failing to bring the Jenkins recommendations to a referendum, suggesting that
this reform effort was not a “deal breaker” for the voting public.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
The reform effort did have the nominal backing of Tony Blair, over the objections of many in the
Labour party (who no doubt got cold feet about the reforms they campaigned on once they were actually in the
majority). But Blair did not intervene on behalf of the Jenkins recommendations to the same extent that he did
in the subnational electoral reform efforts (the London reforms in particular; see below), but instead kicked the
can down the road by keeping reference to national reforms alive in the party’s platform for the next general
election (softening the language to suggest the government would “continue to study” reform proposals). By
the 2005 General Election, there was no commitment to reform in the Labour Party’s platform at all (Mitchell
2005, Footnote 33). Blair’s tepid support of reform in the face of intra-party disagreement would suggest that
he was not the Constitutional Entrepreneur Flinders deems a necessary component of reform.
Likewise, the reform process lacked the ideational change necessary in Flinders’ model. Labour
operated in a rational-strategic manner, supporting reforms only as far as such support would build them the
necessary coalition to unseat the Conservative government. Labour’s appetite for reform at the national level
largely dissipated with their victory. As noted by Mitchell (2005, 174) in discussing UK electoral reforms,
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“[t]here tends to be an inverse relationship between having the will and the power to change an electoral system;
when a party has the will it does not have the power, and when it has the power it does not have the will.”
Success of Reform Effort
The recommendations of the Jenkins Commission never saw the light of a referendum; by the time any
such referendum on electoral reform reached voters in the UK, the proposed reforms no longer bore any
resemblance to the recommendations in the Jenkins report. Given the success of contemporaneous referenda
calling for similar reforms in Scotland, Wales, and London, the fact that voters at the time never got to cast an
up-and-down vote for Mixed-Member elections to the House of Commons represents one of the great “whatifs” in electoral systems research.
National Reform: Liberal Democrats and the 2011 AV Referendum
The final national reform to examine in the UK is the referendum to replace SMP with AV for
elections to the House of Commons, which was introduced (and soundly defeated) in 2011. The process by
which AV came before the electorate is a case-study in the elite-level bargaining that drives the formation of
coalition governments.
Heading into the 2010 UK general election, the positions of the three major political parties on the
issue of electoral reform were well established. The Conservative party had never wavered in their continued
support of the existing SMP system, while the Liberal Democratic party continued to campaign on the desire to
see a more proportional system. Labour’s position was less consistent; in the run-up to the 1997 general
election, they had vocally supported reforms in partnership with the Liberal Democrats. After winning a
majority in the House of Commons in 1997, Labour failed over the next 13 years to act on their previous pledge
to bring a nation-wide electoral reform to referendum. But in the run up to the 2010 general election, the
Labour party re-introduced electoral reform to their platform, advocated for the use of AV in the election of
MPs.
Labour’s motivation for the adoption of this new policy position appears to be opportunistic;
preliminary polling made it clear that Labour was due for an electoral defeat in the upcoming election, but the
odds appears good that no party would gain an outright majority and that the UK would be facing a hung
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parliament for only the second time in its history. By re-introducing electoral reform to its platform, Labour
positioned itself to potentially form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats (Curtice 2013, 216-7).
As it turned out, the dynamics of the post-election coalition-formation process resulted in the adoption
of Labour’s new policy position, but not the installation of Labour in a coalition government. Prior to election
day, the Liberal Democratic party leadership pledged to begin potential coalition negotiations with whichever
party held the most seats; within hours of the first election results being reported, the Lib Dems began
negotiations with the Conservative party (who showed strong gains in early exit polls). Conservatives and Lib
Dems found enough common ground in their negotiations to come close to a collation agreement, but electoral
system reform became a sticking point on which the Conservatives would not budge—the best they would offer
was to create a commission to study the issue and make recommendations (the same deal the Lib Dems had
struck with Labour in 1997, only to see that process go nowhere). Frustrated, the Lib Dems turned to Labour to
seek a better deal. Labour did not hold enough seats to form a majority government with the Lib Dems, but it
was mathematically possible to form a rainbow coalition if Green party and Northern Irish party MPs were
included too. Negotiating on electoral system reform, Labour offered to implement AV as the electoral system
for electing MPs, with no referendum. They would combine that with a later referendum to adopt List PR,
potentially giving the Lib Dems exactly what they sought.
In the end, the Liberal Democratic Party did not accept Labour’s offer. It is possible that the past
experience with the Jenkins Commission and Labour’s reneging on promises of reform had soured their
expectations and lowered their trust of the deal before them; it is also possible that the Lib Dems had less faith
in Labour’s ability to hold together a rainbow coalition government given their current unpopularity with the
electorate. Whatever the reason, the Lib Dems brought Labour’s deal back to the Conservatives to see if
Conservative leader David Cameron could do any better. Cameron committed to bringing a referendum on
adopting AV to the electorate, under the condition that Conservative MPs would be permitted to campaign
against it. The Lib Dems agreed, and a Conservative-Lib Dem coalition government was formed. Lundberg
and Steven (2013, 18) suggest that the acceptance of an AV reform on the part of the Liberal Democrats can be
best understood through the lens of Social Movement theory. Because social movements exist in part to
campaign constantly for change, their capacity to assess the costs and benefits of different types of reform
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opportunities is reduced; they evaluate change with a “systematic bias, exaggerating opportunities and
underestimating constraints” (ibid).
The ironic outcome of this coalition-bargaining process was that it was the Liberal Democrats and the
Conservatives who ended up forming a government, but it was the Labour position on electoral reform that
ended up before the electorate in a referendum. Of course, it was all for naught: the AV referendum came
before the electorate in 2011, voters overwhelmingly rejected the adoption of AV (67.9% voted “No”).
Primary Actor
The process by which AV came before UK voters as a possible reform to the election of MPs was
entirely the product of elite-level negotiations, both on the part of Labour trying to secure a bargaining chip in
coalition negotiations prior to the election, and on the part of the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties
trying to secure a coalition after the election. The outcome of the vote (a resounding “No”) only confirms that
there was no mass-impetus (or even mass-acquiescence) of this reform.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
The only person in the UK government who was in a position to truly help this reform effort navigate
all the potential veto points was Conservative leader (and future Prime Minister) David Cameron. While he
eventually acquiesced to putting an AV referendum before the electorate, he did so only on the condition that
Conservative MPs be allowed to openly campaign against its adoption. There was no true commitment to the
cause of reform; Cameron and the conservative party “had no interest in seeing the reform implemented….”
(Lundberg and Steven 2013, 22). This reform effort did not have the support of a Constitutional Entrepreneur,
nor was there any ideational change in the governing party sufficient to see this reform through to success.
Success of Reform Effort
The reform effort succeeded only in brining Conservatives and Liberal Democrats together long
enough to form a ruling coalition in a House of Commons that was facing the uncertainty of no clear majority
government for only the second time in its history. The reform effort itself was a resounding failure. The
campaign for the referendum on both the Yes and No sides was highly partisan, and spent less time illuminating
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the technical details of the choice before voters, and more time connecting one side or the other with the vices
of individual politicians (Seawright 2013, 461). The result was not only an overwhelming No, but unusually
low voter turnout (ibid:458). The low quality of the debate, and a measured bias toward the No side in UK
newspaper coverage, may have severely hamstrung any chance the reform effort had of succeeding (Renwick
and Lamb 2013, 303).
Yet despite the disappointment felt by many that the hard work that started with the Jenkins
Commission in 1997 would end in such a catastrophic failure 14 years later, all was not lost for advocates of
electoral reform in the UK. Where national reform efforts failed, efforts to implement majoritarian
modifications at the subnational level have been a resounding success.
Subnational Reform
Devolution of legislative authority to subnational bodies, and the subsequent electoral reforms
implemented to populate those bodies, were the result of a period of constitutional reform in the UK that has
been characterized as "radical, yet piecemeal." (Bogdanor 2009, abstract) In 1997, the newly-elected Labour
government under Tony Blair engaged in a process of reforming the unwritten constitution of Britain into a
codified one through a piecemeal process, because there was no political will for a comprehensive reform. The
piecemeal constitutional reforms included the expanded use of Referendums to devolve representative powers
to Scotland and Wales, the Scotland Act of 1998 (direct election of Scottish Parliament), the Government of
Wales Act (1998), the Northern Ireland Act (1998), the Greater London Authority (Referendum) Act, and the
introduction of PR, STV, and Mixed-Member electoral systems into those devolved bodies (Bogdanor 2009,
74)
One major player in pushing the constitutional reform agenda into the Labour Party platform was the
interest group Charter 88. Charter 88 was founded in 1988 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the parliamentary monarch was established under William of Orange.
Starting with a special edition of the New Statesman magazine, Charter 88 petitioned the government for a
series of reforms:
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1.

Enshrine by means of a Bill of Rights, such civil liberties as the right to peaceful assembly, to freedom
of association, to freedom from discrimination, to freedom from detention without trial, to trial by jury,
to privacy and to freedom of expression.
2. Subject executive powers and prerogatives, by whomsoever exercised, to the rule of law.
3. Establish freedom of information and open government.
4. Create a fair electoral system of proportional representation.
5. Reform the upper house to establish a democratic, nonhereditary second chamber.
6. Place the executive under the power of a democratically renewed parliament and all agencies of the
state under the rule of law.
7. Ensure the independence of a reformed judiciary.
8. Provide legal remedies for all abuses of power by the state and by officials of central and local
government.
9. Guarantee an equitable distribution of power between the nations of the UK and between local,
regional and central government.
10. Draw up a written constitution, anchored in the idea of universal citizenship, which incorporates these
reforms.
(Edros 2009, 3)
The goal of these reforms was to reframe the political conversation in the UK around citizenship and
democracy, in order to inspire broad opposition to conservative Thatcherism (Bogdanor 2009, 76). It fit
ideologically with Labour's origins in the liberal philosophy of John Stuart Mill, who advocated greater
participation and constitutional government, more so than in the social democratic principles to which Labour
had started to move. (Bogdanor 2009, 76-77). Charter 88 was supported by over 200 leading figures in UK
politics, literature, and academia (Edros 2009, 2).
Reforms #4 and #9 in Charter 88’s petition became central tenants of the new Labour government’s
reform efforts in 1997; supporting those proposals was key to securing the strategic partnership with the Liberal
Democratic Party necessary to bring down the long-standing Conservative government in 1997. Constitutional
reform, and especially devolution, seem to be at odds with the Labour party's central tenants of redistributing
wealth and ensuring social justice through a strong central government apparatus. Dunleavy (2009, 619) argues
that accounts of constitutional reform in the UK have a tendency to overstate the roles of party self-interest, and
understate the role of Charter 88 and other Electoral Reform organizations in pushing an ideational change.
In addition to Charter 88’s influence, Dunleavy (2009, 620-3) identifies other influential sources of
support for electoral reform:
1.

The Electoral Reform Society (a well-funded outside organization), who campaigned for change,
especially toward STV.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform, which raised the profile of the electoral reform issue inside the
Labour party, the trade unions, and in the House of Commons.
Make Votes Count, an umbrella campaign that pooled the input of many pro-reform bodies
Democratic Audit of the UK, a key intellectual critique body which contributed a series of influential
surveys on reform issues
The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, an "agitprop" foundation with an endowment to sponsor the
majority of events, polls, and research in support of electoral reform.
Flinders counters (in Edros 2009) that Charter 88 did not in fact precipitate a change in the entrenched

ideology that underpinned plurality rule in the UK:
Charter 88 did not succeed in persuading the Labour Party of the need to adopt a holistic or systematic
approach to democratic renewal. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to go further and suggest
that although Charter 88 sat at the centre of a powerful epistemic community it did not achieve a deeper
ideological shift within the Labour Party away from its traditional acquiescence with majoritarianism.
(Edros 2009, 6-7)
Rustin (2009) concurs with Flinders’ assessment. He characterizes Charter 88 as a movement that was not
trying to resolve a crisis of governability exacerbated by constitutional structures, but instead to advance the
political goals of the liberal Left through constitutional means (Rustin 2009, Abstract). Rustin suggests the
timing of the movement betrays its motives; if there was a crisis of governability in Thatcher’s Conservative
government, it was in the 1970s, when the British economy was deep in recession and the workforce was
suffering the effects of de-industrialization. That a Thatcherite government survived this era and was re-elected
in the 1980’s suggests that Conservatives in the UK saw no crisis of governability. Rustin notes:
…with Thatcher’s decisive victories [in the1980’s]. Charter 88 is thus best understood as a bold attempt
to rewrite a political script for a left whose established assumptions, organisations and methods had just
been decisively defeated. Rather than trying to resolve differences of political ends by constitutional
means, Charter 88 was by contrast a movement which sought to formulate political ends in
constitutional terms. Rather than standing ‘above’ politics, this campaign for constitutional reform was
essentially a form of politics. (Rustin 2009, 570)
Labour’s mixed record in supporting reforms toward more consensual government in subnational and
national electoral reform proposals would suggest that Flinders and Rustin may be correct about the lack of a
broader ideational shift in the Labour party. Nonetheless, devolution of powers to local assemblies in Scotland,
Wales, and Northern Ireland did occur under the newly-elected Labour government in 1997, and that devolution
legislation provided for the implementation of more proportional electoral systems to elect members to the
devolved bodies (Bogdanor 2009, 85).
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Scottish Parliament
The devolution of legislative powers to an elected Scottish Parliament was a tenant of the Charter 88
reform proposals, supported by both Labour and the Liberal Democrats in the 1995 Scottish Constitutional
Convention and the 1997 Cook-Maclennan Agreement. After Labour took power in 1997, the government
passed the 1998 Scotland Act to “provide for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament” (Scotland Act of
1998, Preamble) and to establish the “Additional Member System of proportional representation” for the
election of Ministers of Scottish Parliament (MSPs) (ibid, Article 1 Section.3).
There were 73 single-member constituencies established where MSPs would be elected by plurality
vote, combined with 56 MSPs who would be elected in eight seven-member regions, using List PR. The
allocation of regional seats were calculated such that the combination of single-member and list seats in the
region are proportional to the regional vote share for each party (using the d’Hondt formula) (Scottish
Parliament Fact Sheet 2011, 1-4). The use of the Additional Member System (AMS) to elect MSPs was
originally negotiated in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, where Liberal Democrats were pushing for
Single Transferable Vote to prevent the domination of Labour in the Scottish lowlands, but Labour pushed
back for fear of a breakdown in party discipline that may result from STV. AMS represented a compromise
between stability and proportionality that both parties could live with (McLean 1999, 149).
Primary Actor
The process by which the Labour government came to devolve powers to Scotland is best
characterized as a mass-elite interaction that Renwick would call “Passive mass impetus” (Renwick 2011, 457).
Labour sought to gain public favor from reform-minded voters, as well as from the Liberal Democratic Party,
by adopting a position in favor of devolved powers and more proportional elections. Elites remained the
primary actors, and the process remained elite-driven throughout.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
There was no strategically located constitutional entrepreneur at the forefront of the political system
acting as a driving force to ensure proportional representation in a devolved Scottish Parliament, nor was there a
major change in the ideology of political elites that led to the enactment of reform. As with most of the other
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reforms that were attempted under New Labour, the implementation of AMS for Scottish Parliamentary
elections appears to be the result of the rational-strategic bargaining of elites, and not indicative of a paradigm
shift toward a more consociational ideology.
Success of Reform Effort
The reform effort was a success. The Scottish Parliament Act was passed in 1998, and the first
election of MSPs was conducted under the Additional Member System in 1999.
Welsh Assembly
The Scottish Constitutional Convention had a powerful demonstration effect on the development of
Welsh devolution proposals. Prior to the SCC, negotiations around Welsh devolution were hung up by
Labour’s insistence on continuing plurality rule. Plaid Cymru had rejected plurality rule as a naked attempt
on Labour’s part to maintain outright majority control of a devolved Welsh body. But late in the 1992-97
Parliament, shadow Welsh Secretary Ron Davies persuaded the Welsh Labour MPs to consider a variation of
what was being debated for Scotland (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001, 301).
The result of Davies’ intervention was the adoption of a variant of the Scottish AMS electoral system,
with a higher ratio of single-member seats to proportional seats than was used in Scotland. The 1998
Government of Wales Act created a 60-Member National Assembly of Wales, with 40 members elected from
single-member constituencies and 20 members elected from five four-member regions (using the d’Hondt
method of List PR) (Government of Wales Act 1998, Part I, Sections 2-4).
Primary Actor
As with the other reforms in the UK discussed above, political elites were the primary actors in this
reform effort.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
A referendum on devolution had gone before Welsh voters in 1979, and had been convincingly
rejected after opponents successfully portrayed the effort as a Labour power grab. The efforts of Welsh Labour
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MP Davies to sell his fellow Welsh Labour MPs on the idea of a more proportional system, which would
undermine Labour’s own dominance in Wales, proved vital to preventing the 1998 proposal from meeting the
same demise. But while Davies fits the mold of a Constitutional Entrepreneur, the motivation for using a more
proportional electoral system in Wales was still embedded in the larger context of Labour’s rational-strategic
attempts to curry support from Liberal Democrats and reform-minded voters in order to oust the Conservative
government in the 1997 general election; it did not signal an ideational change in the underlying values of the
party.
Success of Reform Effort
A referendum on the devolution of powers to Wales was brought before voters on September 18, 1997,
and passed with 50.3 percent of Welsh voters supporting devolution—a narrow majority, but a victory. The
subsequent Government of Wales Act was passed in the House of Commons in July of 1998, and the first
election to the National Assembly of Wales was held on May 6 th, 1999, using the proposed Additional Member
System (National Assembly for Wales 2015).
The Greater London Authority and the London Mayor
New voting systems for the London Mayor and Greater London Authority were chosen in 1997-98.
The Greater London Authority was constituted as a 25-member body; 14 are elected in large single-member
districts, while 11 are elected at large from all of London, using the Additional Member System (AMS, a
Mixed-Member system that combines SMP constituencies and PR lists). There is a 5% threshold for parties to
win List seats. The London Mayor is elected using Supplementary Vote (Instant Runoff Voting). The selection
of these electoral systems resulted from an extensive decision process primarily driven by a junior minister in
the Department of the Environment (DETR) named Nick Raynsford, his civil servants in the DETR's London
office, and the academic consultants hired by that office. The choice also involved the DETR Secretary of State
John Prescott, the Cabinet's Constitutional Reform Committee, and interactions with the Prime Minister and his
staff. (Dunleavy 2009, 625)
After Labour took control of Government in 1997, Raynsford was dispatched by Prime Minister Tony
Blair on a tour of cities in the US and Germany with "strong Mayor" models of government. Raynsford was
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directed by Blair to design a London government with a strong executive Mayor and the smallest possible
Assembly, with weak powers (to prevent the problems caused by the Greater London Council, which was
abolished by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1986 and had 70 members at its peak). Raynsford was also
instructed to design an Assembly with no clear geographic representation, to orient the body toward a more
strategic (and less constituent-servicing) function.
Academic consultants hired to advise the process concluded that a strong mayor could not be elected in
London with a simple plurality system, because 20% of London voters don't vote for Labour or Conservative
candidates (resulting in a likely winner receiving a small plurality of votes instead of the broad base of support
needed to govern diverse constituents effectively). The consultants recommended a preferential ballot. This
would likely produce winners who were moderate and drew support across party lines. Raynsford and his staff
settled on recommending Supplementary Vote for the Mayoral election because they felt the preferential ballot
structure would maximize a voter’s sense of participation, which would increase the legitimacy of the elected
Mayor.
For the Greater London Authority, the academic consultants recommend using AMS, so as not to
confuse voters (who would be casting SMP votes for House of Commons elections and other local elections on
the same day as the assembly vote).
The Blair Government’s immediate concern was that any Mayoral electoral system chosen not benefit
Ken Livingstone, who was a current Labour MP and former Leader of the Greater London Council.
Livingstone was immensely popular in London, but politically was far to the left of Blair’s New Labour.
Livingstone identified himself as a Democratic Socialist, and was a vocal critic of the Monarchy and a supporter
of Irish Reunification. Blair wanted a strong executive model for London’s government, it would have been
strategically disadvantageous to have a politician in that position whose views were so far at odds with the
moderate Westminster government.
The Blair government did not want to put a system in place that would help Livingstone win the
election, but Livingstone was too popular across London for the electoral system to make a difference (see
below). Of greater strategic value to Labour was that the Supplementary Vote system was originally a Labour
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idea, which would help it pass in parliament. Also of advantage to Labour was that, by precipitating a run-off
between the top-two candidates, it would not help the Liberal Democrats (Dunleavy 2009, 627-8).
The proposals developed by Raysford and his staff, with the input of academic consultants, then went
to the Cabinet's Constitutional Reform Committee, where a number of senior ministers opposed them.
Opposition was led by DETR Secretary of State John Prescott and senior civil servants from the DETR, who
were less enamored of the proposals than the London office DETR civil servants who initially helped advance
them. There was fear from some that introducing any PR would be the "thin edge of the wedge" to wider
reforms (Dunleavy 2009, 628). These fears represented a reversal of the party's earlier support for the CookMaclennan agreement, which concerned both Blair and Raynsford.
Blair called a "sofa government" meeting9 with Raynsford and Prescott to intervene. Their meeting
resulted in the Raynsford recommendations being reinstated, clearing the Committee, and subsequently being
enacted in legislation. Lord Irvine, a vocal opponent of the reforms within the Committee, publicly supported
them afterward by framing the SV system of electing the London Mayor as an "improved First Past the Post
system." (Dunleavy 2009, 628)
Criticism of the choice from Liberal Democrats (who preferred a more proportional system) and of
Conservatives (who called the reforms partisan) were combatted by Labour publishing the reports of the
academic consultants, which were seen as neutral and evidence-based in their compelling arguments for the
proposed reforms.

9

After becoming Prime Minister, Tony Blair frequently held informal closed-door meetings of close advisors
and party allies, where decisions of governance were often debated and decided upon before being openly
discussed in Parliament. Characterized in the press as “sofa government”, Labour insiders attributed this style
of governing as a contributing factor to fall of the Labour government in 2010. See
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/8597534/Ed-Miliband-attacks-Blair-and-Brown-forsofa-government.html.
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Primary Actor
As with the other reform efforts in the UK, the process of reforming London Mayoral and Assembly
elections was an elite-driven process, motivated by the strategic incentives of the new Labour government to
maintain control of the government after decades in the wilderness.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
The personal support of Prime Minister Tony Blair provided the constitutional power necessary to
navigate and overcome the various veto points of the reform process. Blair’s intervention in the Cabinet
Constitutional Committee process was specifically essential to overcoming the intra-party objections to the
process and ensuring the success of the reform proposal.
The maneuvers were largely strategic, and do not suggest a broad ideational change in the governing
party. Specifically, the suggestion by reform critic-turned-supporter Lord Derry Irvine that the Supplementary
Vote used in the Mayoral election was an “improved First Past the Post” would imply that the underlying values
in support of plurality government were still present, and that reform was successful because it was framed as a
continuation of those values.
Success of Reform Effort
Following approval of the House of Commons, a referendum was held in London in which 72% of
voters approved the implementation of the proposed reforms. The first Mayoral election was held in 2000, with
Independent candidate Ken Livingstone winning with 58% of the First- and Second-preference votes.
European Parliament Elections
Prior to 1998, the UK elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in large single-member
districts by plurality vote (with the exception of Northern Ireland, which used STV). In spring of 1998, the UK
adopted a closed-list PR electoral system for the election of MEPs (except for Northern Ireland, which retained
STV). The reform was a component of the original Cook-Maclellan Agreement, and aside from strong support
in the House of Commons for adopting an Open List instead of a Closed List system, there were few barriers to
implementation.
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One possible reason for the lack of opposition to the adoption of MEP electoral reform may have been
the relative lack of political stakes; the European Parliament was a largely unpopular body in the UK, and
turnout in MEP elections had historically been low (Dunleavy and Margetts 2001, 304). Another possibility for
the ease with which PR was adopted may have been that the government may have anticipated that a change
would be forced on them by the EU; in 2002 the European Parliament issued Council Decision 8964/02,
mandating the use of List PR or STV electoral systems for all elections to European Parliament (Ellis and
Laserud 2005, 141-2).
Primary Actor
As with the other reforms born from the Cook-Maclennan Agreement, the changes to the MEP
elections were an elite-driven process. Voters in the UK were historically disengaged with MEP elections
anyway; voter turnout in MEP elections was 34% prior to changing to PR, and in the first PR election, turnout
dropped further to 24%.
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
There was nobody in a position of constitutional authority beating the drum for European election
reform, nor did the adoption of List PR signal a broader appetite for more consensual politics in the UK; it was
simply in the Liberal Democratic Party’s interest to increase proportionality everywhere, and it was in the
interests of Labour to gain Lib Dem support. This reform occurred on the coattails of the larger strategic
initiatives of the Lib-Lab coalition brokered in part by the Cook-Maclennan agreement.
Success of Reform Effort
The reform effort was a success, insofar as the interests of this research are concerned. List PR was
adopted and used in the 1999 MEP election. In a broader sense, the depression of voter turnout and
proliferation MEPs from Euro-skeptic (and, eventually, neo-fascist) parties could be characterized as a failure of
democratic ideals10, but that point is debatable and beyond the scope of this research.

10

In the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, the British National Party (characterized as a fascist party due
to its anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic, ant-homosexual policy positions) won a seat in the European
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Summary
The table below summarizes the results of the cases of viable attempts at majoritarian modification in
the UK. Unlike the Canadian case studies above, the UK provides a combination of successful and failed
efforts. We will see a further mixture of success and failure in the final pair of case studies for analysis, in New
Zealand.
Table 6: Summary of Case Studies -- UK
Case

Con. Entrepreneur

Ideational
Change

Primary
Actor

Level of
Gov.

Success?

UK 97
(Jenkins)

No

No

Elite

Natl

No

UK EP PR

No

No

Elite

Sub*

Yes

UK 11 (AV
Ref.)

No

No

Elite

Natl

No

Scotland

No

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

Wales

Yes

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

London

Yes

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

*Technically a second-order national election, but it will be treated the same as a subnational election for the
purposes of this study.

It is worth noting that this analysis excludes the adoption of Single Transferable Vote as the electoral
system of the devolved Assembly of Northern Ireland, which was established along with the devolved bodies in
Scotland and Wales in 1998. While STV is a form of proportional representation, its adoption in the Irish
context does not meet the criteria for majoritarian modification. STV has been used in Ireland since the
beginning of the 20th century; the government of the UK long saw STV as a viable way of ensuring that
Unionist political parties would not be marginalized. For a more detailed discussion of the history of STV in
the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland, see Farrell 2011 (121-36).

Parliament. See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jun/07/european-elections-manchesterliverpool.
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Case Studies: New Zealand
New Zealand long stood in the literature of political science as the most pure case of a Westminster style
of government, with its unicameral parliamentary legislature and executive, unitary state (with weak
subnational/regional governments), and single-member district plurality elections. But in 1993, the majority
of New Zealand voters elected via referendum to abolish SMP and adopt a Mixed-Member Proportional
electoral system in the mode of West Germany. The path to electoral system reform in New Zealand shows
how the long term effects of voter-party de-alignment, systemic failures of the electoral system, the rise of
new issues that do not fit the existing party structure, and the strategic miscalculation of political elites can all
result in the dramatic reform of a long-standing institution (Vowels 2005, 303).
From SMP to MMP
The road to electoral reform began with the actions of the 1975-1984 National Party government, and
their leader, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. Muldoon was an unusually strong executive in New Zealand
politics, often acting unilaterally against the advice of experts (and the wishes of his own party and popular
opinion). The center-right National Party held a majority in parliament despite successive elections (in 1978
and 1981) in which the center-left Labour Party gained a larger percentage of votes. There is some debate in
the literature as to whether these consecutive “upside down” elections constitute a systemic failure of SMP, or if
the disproportionate, manufactured majority result is exactly the point of SMP (see Shugart 2008). But
regardless of whether such outcomes should be considered aberrant, the result of the consecutive defeats for
Labour was to inspire Labour MP Geoffrey Palmer to take up the cause of electoral reform (Vowels 2008, 17677)
Palmer began advocating for electoral reform as early as 1979. When Labour finally won a majority in
Parliament in 1984, Palmer (who at that point had risen to Deputy Prime Minister), appointed a Royal
Commission to review the electoral system of New Zealand and recommend changes (Vowels 2005, 296-7).
Few in the Labour Party thought that a more proportional electoral system would actually benefit the party. But
Palmer was allowed to appoint his Commission anyway; some in the Party simply deferred to Palmer’s
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expertise and passion, others felt that the work of the Commission ultimately wouldn’t matter, and a few saw a
political benefit in being seen as pro-reform (Vowels 2008, 178).
The Royal Commission was established as a non-partisan body of experts, and directed to study the
electoral system of New Zealand with consideration as to both the “fairness” of the system, and to the
effectiveness of the system in representing and integrating Maori and other minority groups (Lundberg 2007,
475-7). In 1986, the Commission returned a report recommending the adoption of a Mixed Member
Proportional system like that used in West Germany, but only if the change was approved by a referendum of
voters (ibid).
Concurrent to PM Muldoon’s unilateral rule, the successive “upside down” elections of 1978 and
1981, and the Labour party’s investigation of electoral reform beginning in 1984, New Zealand was undergoing
broader political shifts. There were high levels of public dissatisfaction with politicians, and doubts about the
accountability, efficacy, and legitimacy of the political system (Sakamoto 1999, 421). The Labour and National
parties had been undergoing a steady decline in vote share since the 1950s, with a corresponding increase in
vote share for smaller parties (ibid, 423). New social movements were rising in New Zealand society in
response to the unpopular economic liberalization policies of both the Labour and National governments. When
Labour was elected back into government in 1984, they took their cue from Muldoon’s unilateral style; Labour
Prime Minister David Lange led his party in the adoption of numerous policies of deregulation and privatization
that moved New Zealand from one of the most regulated countries in the world to one of the least (Vowels
2008, 177). Importantly for voters, the economic liberalizations undertaken by the Labour government were not
part of Labour’s campaign platform (and indeed, in some cases, went specifically contrary to the Labour
manifesto). When Labour was succeeded by the National party in government in 1990, National continued to
deregulate, slash welfare, and undertake other economic policies in opposition to public opinion (Lundberg
2007, 476-7). The actions of Labour and National in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a fracturing of
the party system, as the New Labour party splintered from Labour, and both the Liberal Party and New Zealand
First party splintered from National. New Labour and the Liberal Party joined other small parties (the Green
party and the Democratic Party, formerly Social Credit), to form an electoral coalition called “Alliance.”
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Alliance and the New Zealand First party each succeeded in winning two seats in the 1993 general election
(Vowels 2005, 296).
The Royal Commission’s recommendation in 1986 to adopt MMP via a referendum gave rise to a new
social movement in New Zealand, the Electoral Reform Coalition (ERC). The ERC campaigned for electoral
reform, and had the backing of both the smaller parties (who were non-competitive under SMP) and eventually
the Trade Unions (who would be weakened by the economic liberalization policies of both Labour and
National). At the time of the Commission’s report, Labour leadership (with the exception of Deputy PM
Palmer) were not interested in pursuing electoral reform. But the idea gained traction among voters, and when
PM Lange was asked about it in a debate running up to the 1987 general election, he mistakenly claimed that
Labour supported a referendum on adopting MMP. It is unclear if Lange accidentally misspoke, or if he was
trying to deliberately win a debate point against his National competitor, but in either case he reneged on the
commitment after Labour was re-elected in 1987 (Lundberg 2007, 477-8).
Lange’s retraction of his earlier pledge to support reform further fueled the efforts of the pro-reform
campaign. Seeing an opportunity to embarrass their rivals for political gain, the National party leadership
pledged to put an MMP referendum before voters if they were elected to government in the 1990 general
election (despite their own opposition to the reform itself). Backed into a political corner by this maneuver,
Labour likewise committed to hold a referendum. Many members of both Labour and National committed to
supporting the referendum, under the assumption that it would have little chance of succeeding. But issue of
electoral reform had been recast in voters’ minds as a way to express dissatisfaction with the unresponsiveness
of the political process, and Labour and National politicians underestimated just how unpopular they had
become (Vowels 2008, 181).
The National party won back control of government in 1990, and agreed to follow through on their
commitment to put a referendum for electoral reform before the voters. But the vote share of smaller parties has
climbed in the last election, and it was clear that moving to a more proportional electoral system would end up
reducing National’s seat-count in parliament. Recognizing that reform was not in their own self-interest,
National attempted to complicate the referendum process in two ways; first, they changed the referendum from
a simple vote between SMP and MMP to a vote between five different electoral systems, in an attempt to
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confuse voters. Second, they made the referendum non-binding, rather than the binding referendum
recommended by the Royal Commission. In spite of these obstacles, over 70% of voters elected to endorse
MMP in the referendum. The overwhelming result compelled the government to hold a second, binding
referendum concurrent to the 1993 general election, in which MMP was approved by 54% of votes (Lundberg
2007, 477-8).
Primary Actor
Electoral reform in New Zealand was a mass-driven process, in which political elites were compelled
to act in a pro-reform fashion (to appease public opinion) and were constrained by public action (through the
referendum process). The mobilization of social movements (the ERC, Trade Unions, smaller parties) helped
supply the necessary pressure to force the governing parties into actions that were not in their own long-term
strategic best interest, and the educational efforts of pro-reform campaigns in the run-up to the first referendum
helped voters overcome the barrier inserted into the process by the National party (in the form of overwhelming
voters with confusing choices).
Constitutional Entrepreneur and Ideational Change
As Flinders (2010, 55) notes, Labour Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer served the function of
constitutional agent in favor of reform early in the process, when other Labour party members were either
uninterested in reforms, or eager to appear pro-reform in the short term. A broad ideational change occurred in
New Zealand society, as new issues and new social movements put pressure on the dominant parties to open the
gates to reform. The dominant parties themselves splintered during this time, putting added pressure on the
system to move away from majoritarianism and toward a more consensual politics.
Success of the Reform Effort
The binding referendum to adopt MMP was approved in the 1993 general election, and three years
later the 1996 general election was help under MMP rules. The effects of moving to a more proportional
system were immediate: the number of parties in Parliament went from 2 in 1987 to 4 in 1993, to 6 in 1996.
From 1987 to 2002, the percentage of women MPs in parliament doubled, and the percentage of Maori MPs
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tripled (Vowels 2005, 301-307). The reform had clearly move New Zealand toward the Royal Commission’s
goals of fairness and minority representation.
Summary
Table 7 summarizes the explanatory and dependent variables of the New Zealand case study.
Table 7: Summary of Case Studies – New Zealand
Case
NZ MMP

Con.
Entrepreneur
Yes

Ideational
Change
Yes

Elite or
Mass
Mass

Level of
Gov.
Natl.

Success?
Yes

A brief note on the 2011 Referendum on the Voting System: In 2010, the National party promised to
hold another referendum on the MMP electoral system in New Zealand, concurrent with the 2011 general
election. The referendum was held on November 26, 2011, and presented New Zealand voters with two
Questions:
1.
2.

Should New Zealand keep the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system?
If New Zealand were to change to another voting system, which voting system would you choose?

For Question 2, four options were presented:
1.
2.
3.
4.

First Past the Post (SMP)
Preferential Voting (AV)
Single Transferable Vote (STV)
Supplementary Member (a modified version of MMP that decouples the Constituent and List seats,
resulting in a less proportional outcome).

Voters chose to keep MMP, with 57.77% of valid votes cast in support of keeping the current system. OF the
42.23% of voters who chose not to keep MMP, nearly half (46.66%) elected to return SMP (Electoral
Commission of New Zealand 2011). Because the majority of voters elected to keep MMP, no further serious
discussion of electoral reform has taken place.
While this attempt by the governing party to change the electoral system through popular referendum
meets the criteria of a viable electoral reform effort, it does not meet the criteria of the specific subset of
electoral reform efforts with which this research is concerned. The goal of this study is to understand
majoritarian modifications: that is, electoral reform efforts that attempt to move a traditionally majoritarian
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political system toward a more consensual one (either by adopting an electoral system that increases
proportionality of the results, or a system that increases voter choice through preferential ballots). The reform
effort in question here does not meet these aims; three of the four alternatives to MMP proposed in the 2011
referendum would result in less proportional outcomes (with only STV standing as a possible improvement on
the proportionality of votes to seats).
While the process of the 2011 Referendum in New Zealand does not meet the criteria for study, its
results are instructive of the resiliency of majoritarian modification when it does succeed. It can be inferred
from the margin by which MMP was retained in 2011 (larger than the margin by which it was approved in
1993) that the underlying changes to political culture in New Zealand that facilitated the successful reform of
1993 are systemic and lingering.
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Analysis
Table 8 summarizes all of the case studies discussed in the preceding sections. The first step of this analysis is
to consider each explanatory variable independently, to see if it has any predictive power. We begin our
analysis by converting our case studies into the following Boolean values (Table 9):
X1 (Constitutional Entrepreneur): Yes = 1, No = 0.
X2 (Ideational Change): Yes = 1, No = 0.
X3 (Elite or Mass Primary Actor): Elite =1, Mass = 0
X4 (Level of Government): Subnational = 1, National = 0
Y (Success): Yes = 1, No = 0.

Table 8: Summary of Case Studies
Case Study

Con. Entrepreneur

Ideational

Elite or Mass

Level of

Success? (Y)

(X1)

Change (X2)

(X3)

Gov. (X4)

Canada

Yes

No

Mass

Natl

No

BC

Yes

No

Mass

Sub

No

PEI

Yes

Yes

Elite

Sub

No

New Brunswick

Yes

No

Elite

Sub

No

Quebec

No

Yes

Mass

Sub

No

Ontario

No

No

Elite

Sub

No

UK 97

No

No

Elite

Natl

No

UK EP PR

No

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

UK 11

No

No

Elite

Natl

No

Scotland

No

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

Wales

Yes

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

London

Yes

No

Elite

Sub

Yes

NZ 93

Yes

Yes

Mass

Natl

Yes
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Table 9: Summary of Case Studies Coded for Analysis
Case

X1

X2

X3

X4

Y

Canada

1

0

0

0

0

BC

1

0

0

1

0

PEI

1

1

1

1

0

New Brunswick

1

0

1

1

0

Quebec

0

1

0

1

0

Ontario

0

0

1

1

0

UK 97

0

0

1

0

0

UK EP PR

0

0

1

1

1

UK 11

0

0

1

0

0

Scotland

0

0

1

1

1

Wales

1

0

1

1

1

London

1

0

1

1

1

NZ 93

1

1

0

0

1

The first hypothesis (H1) proposes that the probability of Y=1 is greater when X1=1 than when X1=0. X1=1 in 7
cases; of those, 43% (3/7) resulted in Y=1. X1=0 in 6 cases; of those, 33% (2/6) resulted in Y = 1.
The second hypothesis (H2) proposes that the probability of Y=1 is greater when X 2=1 than when
X2=0. X2=1 in 3 cases, of which 33% (1/3) result in Y=1. X 2=0 in 10 cases, of which 40% (4/10) result in
Y=1.
The third hypothesis (H3) proposes that the probability of Y=1 is greater when X 3=1 than when X3=0.
X3=1 in 9 cases, of which 44% (4/9) result in success. X3=0 in 4 cases, of which 25% (1/4) result in Y=1.
The fourth hypothesis (H4) proposes that the probability of Y=1 is greater when X 4=1 than when X4=0.
X4=1 in 9 cases, of which 44% (4/9) resulted in Y=1. X 4=0 in 4 cases, of which 25% (1/4) resulted in Y=1.
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Calculating the asymmetrical measure of association (lambda) of these values 11, we discover that the
Proportional Reduction of Error is 0 for all four hypotheses, meaning no predictive value is gained by using any
of the independent variables by themselves. This is because in all four comparisons, the modal value of the
dependent variable is always the same regardless of the value of the independent variable. Electoral reform
failures always outnumber the successes, regardless of which independent variable you use to group the data.
The next step is to convert the results of the case studies in to a Truth Table (Table 10) and use Boolean
analysis to answer the following questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What combinations of values of X1-X4 are not present among the cases selected (logical remainders)?
What combinations of values of X1-X4 are present when Y = “Success”?
What combinations of values in X1-X4 result in both success and failure (logical contradictions)?
Does the evidence support the proposed hypotheses?
Because there are four independent variables, there are 16 possible combinations of variables. Table 10

shows all 16 possible combinations of X1-X4, the number of cases with that combination of values, and what
proportion of those cases resulted in successful reform (the “Consistency” score). A Consistency score of “1”
means all cases resulted in success. When Consistency equals “0”, all cases resulted in failure. A decimal
value between 0 and 1 indicates a logical contradiction; the Consistency score represents the proportion of cases
that resulted in success. For combinations of values that were not represented in the sample of cases (logical
remainders), the Consistency score is “null.”
Of the 16 possible combinations of X1-X4, eight were present in our sample of 13 cases, and 8 were
absent (logical remainders). Of the combinations that were present in the sample, there were two logical
contradictions: 1011 (successful in two of three cases), and 0011 (also successful in two of three cases). One
combination of values for X1-X4 (1100) resulted in a Consistency score of 1 (perfect success).

11

Lambda is an asymmetrical measure of association for nominal values, resulting in a Proportional Reduction
of Error (PRE) value that indicates to what extent predictions of the value of the dependent variable are made
less random by using the independent variable. For further explanation, including formulae, see FrankfortNachmias and Leon-Guerrero 2009, 385-92.
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Table 10: Truth Table with Consistency Score
Source: fsQCA 2.012
X1

X2

X3

X4

Number of Cases

1

0

1

1

3

Consistency
(Y=1)
0.666667

0

0

1

1

3

0.666667

0

0

1

0

2

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

null

1

1

0

1

0

null

1

0

1

0

0

null

0

1

1

1

0

null

0

1

1

0

0

null

0

1

0

0

0

null

0

0

0

1

0

null

0

0

0

0

0

null

12

Truth tables and Consistency scores were calculated using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis software
“fsQCA 2.0”, available for download at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml. The
software was developed by Charles Ragin, Kriss Drass, and Sean Davey.
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Discussion
The most important observation to make up front is that, because the 13 case studies only encompass
eight of the 16 possible combinations of explanatory variables, no statistically valid inferences can be drawn
from the results of an inductive analysis. Any observations made regarding the predictive or explanatory nature
of the measured variables must be limited to the sample itself. This does not render the project itself futile;
there is value in examining the proposed hypotheses within the limited scope of the sample data, as well as
reconciling contradictions in the data, as a way to better understand how process and context in electoral reform
efforts can contribute to their success or failure. While no statistically valid inferences can be drawn from these
hypotheses, a deeper discussion of the cases studied here can inform avenues of future research.
Within the sample itself, hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 did find some evidence of support. While the
proportional reduction of error (lambda) is zero in each hypothesized relationship, there are clear percentage
differences between the categories of independent variables13 in terms of success and failure. Cases in which a
constitutional entrepreneur was present succeeded 43% of the time, compared to a 33% success rate for cases
where the constitutional agent was absent. Reforms in which the primary actors were elites succeeded 44% of
the time, versus a 25% success rate for mass-driven reforms. The same success rates appeared in cases of
subnational reform versus national reform (44% success at the subnational level versus 25% at the national
level). Only the second variable resulted in outcomes contrary to the hypothetical; ideational change was
present in only 33% of successful reform efforts, but 40% of failures.
All of this confirms something that was assumed at the beginning; none of these independent variables
are sufficient conditions for electoral reform success. No one explanatory variable is perfectly predictive of the
outcome, but some insight may be gleaned from observing the variables in relation to one another. There were
three combinations of values that resulted in a successful reform effort:

13

From Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero (2009, 392): “A problem with interpreting lambda arises in
situations in which lambda is zero but other measures of association indicate that the variables are
associated…if the percentage differences are larger [than 5%], indicating that the two variables may be
associated, lambda will be a poor choice as a measure of association…”
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1.
2.
3.

No Constitutional Entrepreneur, No Ideational Change, Elite Driven Process, at the Subnational
Level (Scotland and the UK European Parliament).
A Constitutional Entrepreneur, No Ideational Change, an Elite Driven Process, at the Subnational
Level (Wales and London).
A Constitutional Entrepreneur, Ideational Change, Mass Driven Process, at the National Level
(New Zealand).

In QCA logical notation14, these three conditions can described as: (~X1·~X2·X3·X4) + (X1·~X2·X3·X4) +
(X1·X2·~X3·~X4)
Using Boolean algebra15, the expression can be simplified to:
(X1·X2·~X3·~X4) + (~X2·X3·X4)
Expressed narratively, this simplified logical statement says that reform will succeed under one of the following
two configurations:
1.
2.

A constitutional entrepreneur and ideational change are present in a mass-dominated reform at the
national level, or;
Ideational change is absent in an elite-dominated reform at the subnational level (regardless of whether
a constitutional entrepreneur is present or absent).

These results could be interpreted to support the rationale behind H 4 (reform should be easier at the subnational
level due to fewer barriers). Whereas reform at the national level only succeeds with a constitutional
entrepreneur and a mass-dominated process (essentially, a mass-elite synergy), subnational reform can succeed
with just an elite-dominated process, regardless of whether a constitutional agent is guiding it (the absence of
ideational change has no theoretical basis for being a necessary condition for the success of the reform; its
presence in the second configuration of success is more likely an artifact of the counterfactual case not being
present in the data set to invalidate the variable’s necessity).
It would be tempting to draw more definitive conclusions from this analysis. However, this
simplification fails to tell the whole story. Two of the three successful configurations in the data set were

14

15

This notation, provided by Ragin (n.d.), uses the following symbols to represent logical operators:
AND: ·
OR: +
NOT: ~

Simplification performed using the Wolfram Alpha computation engine available at
http://www.wolframalpha.com. The following input was used:
“simplify (not A AND not B AND C AND D) OR (A AND not B AND C AND D) OR (A AND B AND not C AND not D)”
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logical contradictions: the conditions of success in Scotland and the UK EP reforms were present in the failure
of Ontario’s reform effort, and the conditions of success in Wales and London were present in the failure of
New Brunswick. Each contradiction had a Consistency score of .667, suggesting that the cases were more
successful than not, but they were not definitive configurations of success. Only the conditions of success in
New Zealand were uniquely present in a successful reform effort but not in a failed one (a Consistency score of
1). Let’s look at each of these cases more closely.
Politics Matter: The UK, Ontario, and New Brunswick
In both the failed case of the Ontario reform effort and the successful case of the Scotland and UK EP
reform efforts, an elite-dominated electoral reform process was undertaken at the subnational level, with no
constitutional entrepreneur to guide the process through its various veto points, and no ideational change in the
governing parties to reduce the overall number of veto points.. But a number of differences mark the contexts
of these two reforms, which may provide avenues for further analysis. The most marked difference was the
breadth of support for the UK reforms, which were accepted by Labour on a largely act-contingent basis
(wanting to be seen as pro-reform), but also accepted by Liberal Democrats (and at least tacitly accepted by the
Scottish National Party) on an outcome-contingent basis (as more proportionality would help their numbers in
the newly devolved Scottish Parliament). In Ontario, there was little political support for reform outside of the
Liberal party. As soon as the Liberals benefited from the disproportionality of an SMP election and took
control of government with only 46% of the vote, their support for reform waned (and indeed, they made a
concerted effort to put barriers in place of reform). Flinders’ original assessment was that the rational-strategic
considerations of elites were an insufficient explanation of electoral reform, and that changes in those
considerations must be viewed in the light of broader ideational shifts in the values of the political culture (away
from majoritarian values). The success of the UK reforms and the failure of effort in Ontario would suggest
that rational-strategic actions may be a sufficient explanation of electoral reform absent an ideational change, so
long as multiple elite actors have sufficient overlapping strategic interests (and those interests are long-term
enough to survive short-term changes in the political landscape) to form a “coalition of the willing” whose joint
ability to guide the reform process is sufficient to overcome barriers. Such a coalition was present in the UK
reforms, and absent in Ontario.
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Another significant difference between Ontario and the UK reforms was the nature of the institution
that was being reformed. In the case of Ontario, SMP had been used to elect members of the Provincial
Parliament for as long as anyone could remember. While SMP was also the historically dominant electoral
system in the UK, the Scottish Parliament was a newly-created institution (and elections to the European
parliament were a relatively recent phenomenon as well). There may be some explanatory value based on the
“stickiness” of an institution, or the willingness of political elites to experiment with new institutions; it would
be worth further consideration to explore the other explanatory variables discussed in this research in
relationship to the length of tenure of the extant system which is to be reformed.
Furthermore, while elites drove the process of reform in both Ontario and Scotland, there is a nuanced
difference in the context of that elite support. Ontario political elites were driving reform for Ontario, as a selfcontained process in the confined context of a single province in the Canadian federal system. Unlike Canada,
the UK is not a federal system, but a unitary system with a strong central government and weak subnational
bodies. The Scottish reform was not driven by political elites at the Scottish subnational level, but by elites at
the UK national level, operating from the position of strength afforded the central government in a unitary
system, and in the context of a larger set of reforms for subnational entities across the entire state. This would
suggest that future analysis of majoritarian modification at the subnational level should consider not only
whether the process is mass or elite dominated, but the relative power dynamics of masses and elites operating
at different levels and in different configurations of government.
This question of whether the reform effort is endogenous or exogenous to the level of government
being reformed ought to be considered in the case of the UK European Parliament reform as well. The adoption
of PR for the election of MEPs was driven in part by pressure from the European Union on its member states to
use PR for elections to the European Parliament. Indeed, it was not long after the adoption of PR for UK MEP
elections that the EU made it mandatory for all member states. While the relationship between the EU and the
UK is not perfectly analogous to the relationship between the UK central government and its devolved
assemblies in Scotland and Wales (the EU does not wield constitutional power over the UK the same way the
UK wields such authority over its subnational bodies), the relationship does offer a symmetry of exogenous
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influence. Future studies of electoral reform ought to consider an exogenous/endogenous dimension of
analysis.
Like Ontario, New Brunswick had experienced a recent history of perverse outcomes under SMP
elections, including the Liberal Party’s clean sweep of all 58 seats of the Legislative Assembly in 1987, with
only 60.9% of the vote province-wide. The impetus for reform came from the long-time victim of those
distortions, the Progressive Conservative party. The reform process was ultimately derailed by chance political
circumstances; the Progressive Conservatives held only a one-seat plurality in the Assembly, and the pending
retirement of a PC MLA prompted the government to call for general elections, under fear that the election to
replace that one MLA would tip the power of government. The strategy backfired, as the election resulted in
yet another distorted outcome in favor of the Liberal party over the PCs. With the PCs out of government, the
proposed referendum to reform the electoral system never saw the light of day. It is not clear if the reform
effort would have succeeded before the voters (although the failure of similar referenda in BC and Ontario may
be instructive). What is clear is that the factors leading to the failure of the reform effort in New Brunswick
were circumstantial and peculiar to the short-term political situation; not much can be generalized from such
circumstances.
The situation in New Brunswick was not unlike that of New Zealand, where the government that
initially commissioned the study of electoral reform was out of power before it had a chance to implement the
recommended reforms. But whereas New Brunswick Liberals felt no political pressure to further pursue the
reform proposals of their political rivals, the New Zealand reforms succeed precisely because the changing
political culture put pressure on both dominant parties to pursue reform.
New Zealand: The Perfect Storm
The lone example of a combination of explanatory variables that were uniquely successful (a
Consistency score of 1) comes from New Zealand, whose electoral reform came with the help of a
constitutional entrepreneur, in a time of ideational change in the political system and the electorate more
broadly (with the splintering of dominant parties and new social movements arising), in a mass-dominated
process at the national level. As in the subnational UK reforms, the New Zealand reform effort was able to
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engender a coalition of actors whose long-term strategic interests aligned with reform. That this coalition was
in sync with a changing political climate, and had the benefit of a well-placed constitutional agent early in the
reform process, only helped the reform effort survive the short-term fluctuations in the political landscape.
The majoritarian values that undergird plurality electoral systems (stability, strong majorities, and
constituent-voter linkage) anchor those systems so firmly in the political culture of a polity, that any attempt to
reform those systems in a manner more in keeping with consensual political values will always face a strong
inherent bias in favor of the status quo. It can be an insurmountable task if the existing institutions do not offer
a mechanism for pursuing reform, if the governing elites have a rational-strategic incentive to prevent reform, or
if the underlying values of the political culture remain majoritarian (prompting the citizenry to adopt a position
on reform somewhere between neutral and hostile). As the case of New Zealand demonstrates, a successful
electoral reform effort at the national level requires an interplay between pro-reform actors with institutional
power and a broader shift in the political cultural values, in order to shift the rational-strategic analysis of elites
toward supporting reform (if only in an act-contingent manner). In other words, the success of New Zealand’s
electoral reform effort can best be understood as a “perfect storm” of institutional, cultural, and rational
alignment.
Level of Government, or Magnitude of Reform?
Finally, let us circle back to Jacobs and Leyenaar’s framework of major, minor, and technical reforms.
Thus far, the 13 cases of this study have been analyzed according to a parsimonious reading of Jacobs and
Leyenaar’s framework, making the theoretical assumption that subnational reforms are more likely to succeed
because they are “minor” in nature, and will face fewer and lower barriers to success than major reforms at the
national level. But Jacobs and Leyenaar offer a nuanced caveat to that framework, suggesting that certain
reforms at the subnational level should still be considered “major” if the country in question is a federal state
with “significant competences for the regions” (2011: Endnote 9). Canada is a federal system in which the
balance of power is more evenly distributed between central and provincial governments, and the UK is a
unitary system with a strong central government and weak subnational bodies. Reclassifying the Canadian
provincial reforms as major reforms (alongside the national reform efforts of Canada, the UK, and New
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Zealand) removes all logical contradictions form the analysis, and produces a Truth Table in which the three
configurations of success all have Consistency scores of 1 (Table 11).
Table 11: Truth Table with Modified X4 (Logical Remainders Omitted)
Source: fsQCA 2.0
X1

X2

X3
1

X4
Modified
0

Number
of Cases
3

Consistency
(Y=1)
0

0

0

1

0

1

1

2

1

1

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

These results provide a much cleaner reading of majoritarian modification: if the reform is major in
magnitude, it requires a constitutional entrepreneur, ideational change, and a mass-dominated process (the
perfect storm) to succeed. For minor reforms, an elite-driven process is sufficient for success (even in the
absence of ideational change, and regardless of whether a constitutional entrepreneur guides the process).
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Conclusion
The underlying theoretical proposition of this research, that the success or failure of a “majoritarian
modification” can best be explained by an interplay of institutional, cultural, and rational-strategic factors, holds
true after the preceding analysis, even if the explanatory variables specifically analyzed do not provide a
uniform and comprehensive set of necessary and sufficient criteria for reform. For its part, this research hopes
to suggest a path (through qualitative comparative analysis of case studies) to illuminate that relationship
between process and context, to help move the field of electoral system studies toward a greater understanding
of what ingredients, in what proportions, comprise the “secret sauce” that gives an electoral reform the best
chance to succeed.
The findings of this research provide some direction for the next iteration of study of majoritarian
modification. For one, the universe of cases must be expanded. Renwick (2011) finds 84 cases of “significant”
electoral reform in Europe since 1945. A sample that large would stretch the bounds of effective QCA (which
requires a deep-dive case study approach to tease out the nuances and interactions of the variables), but a
representative sample could provide for a more statistically valid analysis. A future study would need a large
enough sample to have a realistic chance at reducing the number of logical remainders (of which there will be
an increasing number, as additional variables are added to the analysis).
The dichotomous nature of the analysis may also be a limiting factor to be addressed in a future study.
While crisp-set QCA requires dichotomous variables for its Boolean logic-based analysis to operate, there is a
variation of QCA called fuzzy-set QCA (see Ragin and Rihoux 2009), that uses fuzzy-set algebra to determine
consistency scores for outcomes based on interval variables. Rather than coding a variable 0 or 1 in terms of its
presence or absence in a set, a fuzzy set codes the degree of membership in a set as a decimal value between 0
and 1, and codes its absence from the set as the remainder (for example, if measuring mass-elite domination of a
reform effort, rather than scoring the case 1 for elite or 0 for mass, the case may be scored .75 elite and .25
mass, or any other combination that sums to 1). Using fuzzy-set QCA, Renwick’s scale of mass-elite
domination in the reform process can be unpacked from the simple “mass or elite” analysis present here and recoded as a 5-point scale of mass-elite imposition, as his research initially intended.
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Fuzzy-set logic could also be used to tease out the concept of “elites” in elite-dominated reform
processes. Several cases of reform failure (Ontario, New Brunswick, PEI) were elite driven, but the elites in
those cases were just the parties in power, whereas the successful subnational reforms in the UK were led by a
coalition of elites with overlapping interests. A subset of cases in which the reform process was elite-driven
could be scored in terms of how much elite consensus there was for reform on a scale of 0 (no consensus with
the governing party or among a governing coalition) to 1 (total consensus within the governing party or among
coalition parties).
Taking a cue from the logical contradiction found between the Ontario case and the Scotland case, a
fuzzy-set analysis could also be used to consider the tenure of the extant institution whose electoral system is
being reformed. That tenure would be evaluated qualitatively, on a scale from 0 (well-established) to 1 (nonexistent), with the theoretical presupposition that less well-established institutions have a lower barrier to
reform. The level of government should also be reconsidered, as the different outcomes of subnational reform
in the UK and Canada suggest that subnational reforms that were self-contained in Canadian provinces did not
succeed at the pace that nationally-imposed reforms on subnational bodies in the UK did. Elite-driven reforms
at the subnational level should be considered within the context of broader institutional structures; one possible
theoretical conception of this would be to say that elite driven reforms to subnational governments ought to be
most successful when imposed by national-level elites in unitary systems, by subnational elites in confederal
systems, and by a partnership of national and subnational elites in federal systems. This interaction can be
captured with cases rated on a scale of 0 (confederal) to 1 (unitary) and on a scale of 0 (process dominated by
subnational elites) to 1 (process dominated by national elites), with the expectation that cases of successful
reform would include an intersection of those values close to 0 and 0 (for confederal systems), 1 and 1 (in
unitary systems), or .5 and .5 (in federal systems).
A more comprehensive analysis of majoritarian modifications, with a larger sample of cases and a
larger set of theoretically-justified explanatory variables, may ultimately yield a more precise and definitive
measure of how the interplay of process and context result in successful reform.
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